Kallas says EU could admit new members by 2030 as enlargement regains momentum

The European Union could admit new members by 2030, its foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas told reporters in Brussels, framing enlargement as a geopolitical necessity rather than a bureaucratic exercise. The statement accompanied the European Commission's annual assessment of ten aspirant countries, a process that had languished for years until Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 forced a strategic rethink.

Geopolitics rewrites the enlargement calculus

"Russia's full-scale invasion in Ukraine and the geopolitical shifts make the case for enlargement very clear cut," Kallas said. "It is a necessity if we want to be a stronger player on the world stage." The former Estonian prime minister argued that the security architecture of the continent now depends on integrating the countries lying between the EU's current eastern border and Russia. That logic applies most urgently to Ukraine and Moldova, both granted candidate status in June 2022, but it also revives the long-stalled Western Balkan candidacies.

The Commission's 2024 enlargement package, published on 30 October, evaluates Montenegro, Serbia, Albania, North Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, Turkey and Kosovo. The reports reveal a widening gap between the frontrunners and those where democratic standards are deteriorating. Montenegro, with a population of 624,000, remains the most advanced, having opened all 35 negotiating chapters and provisionally closed three. Albania, population 2.7 million, moves in parallel after the two countries were decoupled from the more problematic Serbian track in 2022.

Montenegro and Albania: the achievable targets

Kallas singled out Montenegro and Albania as the likeliest entrants before 2030. Commissioner Marta Kos reinforced that assessment, stating there would be "no big financial implications" or policy disruption for existing members from admitting the two small Western Balkan states. The Commission's language suggests a political decision to deliver a tangible enlargement success within the current institutional framework, avoiding the deeper treaty changes that larger accessions would demand.

Montenegro's progress rests on judicial reform and the fight against organised crime, areas where the Commission still sees gaps. Albania's screening process is further advanced, but both countries must satisfy the "fundamentals first" principle, rule of law, functioning institutions, and public administration reform, before closing chapters. The Commission's relative optimism contrasts with the scepticism that greeted previous target dates, notably the 2025 horizon once floated for Serbia and Montenegro.

Ukraine and Moldova: war and hybrid pressure

Ukraine's candidacy presents a different order of magnitude. With a pre-war population of 41.4 million and reconstruction needs estimated in the hundreds of billions of euros, Ukrainian accession would reshape the EU's budget, agricultural policy and cohesion funds. Kallas acknowledged that "no candidate country had ever implemented such sweeping reforms while at war," citing progress on anti-corruption bodies, judicial independence and media legislation. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, speaking via video link from Pokrovsk, a frontline city in Donetsk region, said he wants membership before 2030.

Moldova, population 2.4 million, received the Commission's strongest praise. Kos said it had made "the greatest progress of any country in one year, despite the continuous hybrid threats and attempts to destabilise the country on its EU course." The government in Chișinău has accused Moscow of illicit party funding, vote buying and propaganda campaigns ahead of the October 2024 presidential election and constitutional referendum on EU integration. Yet Moldova's negotiation track is formally linked to Ukraine's, meaning Budapest's veto on the latter stalls the former.

Georgia: a candidate in name only

The sharpest language was reserved for Georgia. Kos described it as an EU candidate country "in name only" after the ruling Georgian Dream party pushed through a "foreign agents" law modelled on Russian legislation, requiring civil society groups receiving foreign funding to register under a stigmatising label. EU leaders halted accession talks in June 2024 after a violent crackdown on peaceful protesters. The European Parliament reported in July that more than 500 people had been detained under administrative procedures, 300 of whom were subjected to torture or other inhuman and degrading treatment.

"If you are serious about the EU, then listen to your people and stop putting the opposition leaders and journalists and people who think differently than you into jail. Then we can talk," Kos said, addressing the Georgian government directly. The Commission's report notes a systematic dismantling of checks and balances, including the removal of the independent election administration and the stacking of courts. With parliamentary elections scheduled for October 2024, the EU has made clear that further democratic backsliding will freeze the process entirely.

Serbia: protests and strategic ambiguity

Serbia's assessment is mixed. President Aleksandar Vučić has faced a year of mass protests triggered by the collapse of a railway station canopy in Novi Sad on 1 November 2023, which killed 16 people and exposed corruption in infrastructure contracts. The demonstrations widened into a broader movement against state capture and media control. The Commission, long criticised for excessive leniency towards Belgrade, has hardened its tone. Kos cited "backsliding on freedom of expression and academic expression" and demanded Serbian authorities "make their strategic choice clear" by avoiding anti-EU rhetoric.

Vučić maintains a balancing act: pursuing EU integration while deepening ties with Moscow and Beijing. Serbia has not aligned with EU sanctions against Russia. The Commission's report notes progress on some technical chapters but flags the lack of results in the rule of law cluster. The EU's leverage is limited by Serbia's energy dependence on Russia and the political sensitivity of Kosovo, where the normalisation dialogue remains stalled.

The Hungarian veto and the search for workarounds

Enlargement requires unanimity among the 27 member states. Hungary, under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, has blocked the next step in Ukraine's accession talks, the opening of negotiating clusters, with the inadvertent effect of halting Moldova's progress, since the two processes are linked. Budapest cites concerns over minority rights in Ukraine and the protection of Hungarian companies' assets, but the veto is widely seen as leverage in broader disputes over rule-of-law conditionality and frozen EU funds.

To evade the Budapest blockade, officials are studying how to advance negotiations without formal sign-off from all 27 capitals. Options include moving technical work forward at expert level, opening "screening" processes that do not require a Council decision, or using the European Council's strategic agenda to give political impetus without triggering the veto mechanism. None of these shortcuts can replace the final unanimous vote required for treaty accession, but they could keep momentum alive through the current institutional cycle.

Reform before enlargement or enlargement before reform?

The prospect of a union of 35 or more members has revived the debate over institutional reform. Critics argue that the current unanimity requirement in foreign policy and taxation makes the EU vulnerable to single-state blockades, a dynamic already visible in the Hungarian veto. Proposals include qualified majority voting on foreign policy, a smaller Commission, and changes to the rotating presidency. Kallas acknowledged the discussion: "The world order is changing as we speak and it's a question for us, what is our role there, and whether we are able to play this geopolitical game, and we are only able to play this game if we are able to adopt decisions."

Kos suggested reform is not a prerequisite for admitting Montenegro or Albania, given their small size and limited budgetary impact. Ukraine is another matter. Net recipients of EU cohesion funds, led by Poland, fear that Ukrainian accession would flip them into net contributor status. Agricultural exporters such as France worry about market disruption from Ukraine's vast grain output. These distributional conflicts cannot be resolved without a negotiated multiannual financial framework, which itself requires unanimity.