Rutte tells European Parliament the continent cannot defend itself without America

Mark Rutte does not mince words. Addressing the European Parliament's defence and foreign affairs committees on Monday, the NATO secretary-general delivered a blunt assessment of Europe's military reality: without the United States, the continent cannot defend itself. "If anyone thinks here ... that the European Union or Europe as a whole can defend itself without the U.S., keep on dreaming," he told MEPs. "You can't."

A reality check on strategic autonomy

The phrase "European pillar of NATO" has become common currency in Brussels, a shorthand for the ambition to build credible European military capacity within the alliance. Rutte dismissed it as "a bit of an empty word." A standalone European army, he argued, would create "a lot of duplication" with existing NATO structures. Moreover, "Putin will love it," he added, suggesting fragmentation would play into Russian hands.

His intervention comes at a moment when European leaders are again debating strategic autonomy, spurred by Donald Trump's return to the White House and his transactional view of alliances. The US president's threats to seize Greenland by force, accompanied by tariff warnings against Denmark, pushed the alliance to what Rutte called "the brink of collapse" earlier this month. Trump subsequently ruled out military action and dropped the tariff threat after announcing a deal giving the United States greater control over the Arctic island, though both Denmark and Greenland insist they will not compromise on sovereignty.

The Greenland episode and Trump's leverage

Rutte, whom Trump credited with helping broker the Greenland arrangement, admitted he had "no mandate to negotiate" on behalf of Denmark. He also dismissed any linkage between the Greenland talks and US security guarantees for Ukraine. The episode nonetheless illustrated the volatility of the transatlantic relationship under Trump. Rutte's response has been to insist that channels remain open and that Washington retains a "total commitment" to collective defence. "The U.S. needs NATO," he said.

He went further, crediting Trump for the fact that all NATO members finally met the 2 percent of GDP defence spending target last year. "Do you really think that Spain and Italy and Belgium and Canada would have decided to move from 1.5 to 2 percent ... without Trump. No way," Rutte said. The observation is uncomfortable for European governments that have long promised higher spending but only delivered under external pressure.

The cost of going it alone

Rutte's most striking claim concerned the price of genuine European independence. Allies have pledged to raise defence spending to 5 percent of GDP by 2035. Rutte called that figure a fantasy if the goal is to replace the American contribution. "For Europe, if you really want to go it alone … forget that you can ever get there with 5 percent. It will be 10 percent," he argued, adding that replicating the US nuclear deterrent alone would cost "billions and billions of euros."

The numbers are sobering. NATO's European members and Canada spent an estimated 2.02 percent of combined GDP on defence in 2024, up from 1.47 percent in 2014. Reaching 5 percent would require an additional roughly €500 billion annually at current economic output. Doubling that to 10 percent would approach €1 trillion. No European electorate has been asked to contemplate such a burden.

The €90 billion Ukraine loan and the procurement fight

Beyond the big strategic picture, Rutte waded into a live legislative battle over the EU's €90 billion loan package for Ukraine, agreed in principle last year and designed to run until 2027. The European Commission's proposal, published this month, directs two-thirds of the funds toward Ukrainian military expenditure but prioritises EU arms manufacturers as suppliers. Kyiv may only tap the loan for non-European weapons if it demonstrates an "urgent need for a product and where no alternative [exists]," and obtains approval from both the Commission and national capitals.

That restriction followed lobbying by France, backed by Greece and Cyprus, to bar non-EU countries, principally the United States, from winning contracts financed by the loan. Germany and the Netherlands opposed the move, arguing it would limit Ukraine's ability to buy the most effective systems quickly. The European Parliament last week agreed to fast-track the loan, while member states continue to negotiate a compromise on the legal text.

Rutte was unequivocal. "Europe is now building its defense industry … but it cannot at the moment provide ... nearly enough of what Ukraine needs to defend itself today," he told MEPs. "So as you take this loan forward, please I encourage you to keep Ukraine's needs first in focus." The subtext was clear: European industrial policy should not come at the expense of a war that is being fought now.

Industrial reality versus political ambition

The tension Rutte exposed is not new. European defence ministers have spoken for years about reducing dependence on American platforms, from fighter jets to air defence and precision munitions. The European Defence Fund and the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP) are meant to boost capacity. Yet production rates for 155mm artillery shells, the workhorse of the war in Ukraine, only reached 1.5 million annually in late 2024, well short of the 2 million target and far below Russian output. Air defence interceptors, long-range strike missiles and advanced electronics remain heavily reliant on US supply chains.

Rutte's argument is that the timeline matters. Ukraine's armed forces need Patriot and NASAMS interceptors, HIMARS rockets, and F-16 spare parts today. European alternatives, IRIS-T, SAMP/T, future FCAS or Eurodrone systems, are either in limited supply or years from deployment. Insisting on "buy European" clauses in a loan designed for immediate warfighting needs, he implied, is a category error.

The political divide in the Council

The split among member states reflects deeper disagreements about the purpose of European defence integration. France has long championed a sovereign European defence industrial base, arguing that strategic autonomy requires control over supply chains and technology. Paris sees the Ukraine loan as a lever to build that base. Germany, the Netherlands and several eastern members prioritise immediate military effectiveness and transatlantic interoperability. They fear that protectionist procurement rules will delay deliveries and alienate Washington.

Rutte's intervention aligns him with the latter camp. As a former Dutch prime minister, he knows the northern European instinct to keep defence markets open and to avoid duplicating US capabilities. His warning that "Putin will love" a fragmented European effort is aimed at the French vision of a standalone pillar.

A transatlantic relationship defined by leverage

Rutte's appearance in Brussels was as much about managing Trump as about advising MEPs. By crediting the US president for the 2 percent spending milestone, he flattered a leader who measures alliances in transactional terms. By insisting the US "needs NATO," he framed the alliance as indispensable to American interests, not merely a European security blanket. The Greenland episode showed how quickly the temperature can rise. Trump's threats were extraordinary: a NATO ally's territory targeted by the alliance's leading power. That the crisis was defused through a deal giving the US "more control" over Greenland suggests the transactional logic works both ways.

European governments are now gaming out the next four years. Some hope Trump's focus will shift to China, leaving Europe to manage its own neighbourhood with US backing. Others fear a second term will bring demands for 3 or 4 percent GDP spending, withdrawal from eastern flank deployments, or bilateral deals that bypass NATO. Rutte's message was that none of these scenarios changes the fundamental asymmetry: Europe's security architecture is built around American enablers, nuclear deterrence, strategic lift, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, command and control, that cannot be replicated quickly or cheaply.

The €90 billion loan is a test case. If the EU restricts procurement to European firms, it signals that industrial policy trumps battlefield urgency. If it opens the funds to US suppliers, it acknowledges that transatlantic interoperability and immediate capability matter more than industrial sovereignty. Rutte has made his view plain. The compromise that emerges from the Council will reveal whether European governments agree.

For now, the secretary-general's verdict stands: keep dreaming if you think Europe can go it alone. The numbers, the industrial base, and the nuclear umbrella all say otherwise.

NATO Secretary-General's office | European Parliament foreign affairs committee | European Commission press corner