Technology · Digital regulation
De Wever attacks EU AI overregulation in book before competitiveness summit
Belgian prime minister argues Brussels has stifled innovation while the US builds trillion-dollar tech giants, as leaders prepare for informal castle meeting with Draghi and Letta.
Belgian Prime Minister Bart De Wever has launched a frontal assault on the European Union's approach to artificial intelligence regulation, arguing in a new book that Brussels has smothered the continent's capacity to compete in the defining technology of the age. The book, titled "On prosperity" and released on Saturday, arrives days before De Wever hosts an informal gathering of EU heads of state and government at a castle in the Belgian countryside to discuss the bloc's fading competitiveness.
The regulation that arrived before the industry
De Wever's central charge is straightforward: the EU adopted the world's first comprehensive AI law in 2024, yet not one of the global leaders in artificial intelligence is European. "In Europe, we have far exceeded the limit of overregulation," he writes. "None of the global leading companies in this sector is European. And yet we pat ourselves on the back because we're the first continent with far-reaching AI regulation." The argument is not new in European industry circles, but it carries particular weight coming from a sitting prime minister who leads the EU's rotating council presidency until the end of June.
The EU AI Act classifies systems by risk level and imposes strict requirements on high-risk applications, including conformity assessments, data governance obligations and transparency rules. When the legislation was finalised, the Commission presented it as a global standard-setter. Since then, the mood has shifted. Industry groups have warned that compliance costs and legal uncertainty are driving investment elsewhere, and the Commission itself acknowledged the problem in November 2025 by proposing to water down certain provisions and delay key requirements for high-risk systems.
A capital markets diagnosis
De Wever's critique extends well beyond artificial intelligence. He identifies fragmented capital markets as a structural reason Europe fails to scale innovative companies. European entrepreneurs, he argues, must still turn to the United States when they need growth capital. The result, in his telling, is stark: Europe has not produced a single new company with a market value exceeding €100 billion. The United States, by contrast, has minted seven worth more than $1 trillion each, Microsoft, Apple, Amazon, Alphabet, Meta, Tesla and Nvidia. He allows one possible exception: ASML, the Dutch semiconductor equipment maker whose lithography machines are indispensable to advanced chip manufacturing.
The numbers are arresting, though they require context. Europe's largest listed companies by market capitalisation, LVMH, Novo Nordisk, SAP, ASML, are mostly long-established firms. The absence of a new entrant above the €100 billion threshold since the turn of the millennium reflects deeper issues: a venture capital ecosystem a fraction of the US size, pension funds that rarely allocate to early-stage equity, and a bankruptcy framework that varies wildly across member states. A genuine capital markets union, which the Commission has pursued since 2015, would require harmonising insolvency law, securitisation rules and supervisory convergence, none of which has materialised at the necessary scale.
Antwerp's petrochemical test case
De Wever's political power base is the port of Antwerp, home to Europe's largest integrated petrochemical cluster. The complex, which includes operations from BASF, TotalEnergies, ExxonMobil and Ineos, has faced rising energy costs, carbon pricing under the EU Emissions Trading System, and competition from US Gulf Coast plants benefiting from cheap shale gas. Several units have announced closures or capacity reductions in the past two years. For De Wever, the cluster's struggle is Exhibit A in the case that European regulation, environmental, competition, energy, is eroding the industrial base that funds the welfare model.
The Belgian government has pushed for changes to the EU's state aid framework to allow more support for strategic industries, and De Wever has argued that the bloc's competition rules prevent the consolidation needed to create European champions. Critics counter that the petrochemical sector's difficulties reflect a global transition away from fossil feedstocks, not merely regulatory overreach. The tension between decarbonisation targets and industrial policy is one the upcoming summit will not resolve.
The castle summit and the Draghi factor
Next Thursday's informal meeting at the Château de Val-Duchesse, or possibly another castle in the Flemish countryside; the venue has not been officially confirmed, brings together EU leaders with two former Italian prime ministers who have authored major reports on European competitiveness. Mario Draghi, former ECB president and Italian premier, delivered a sweeping report in September 2024 arguing that the EU needs an additional €750 billion to €800 billion per year in investment to close the productivity gap with the United States. Enrico Letta, who preceded Draghi as prime minister, produced a 2024 report on the single market calling for a "fifth freedom", the free movement of knowledge, research and innovation.
Both men have argued that the EU's regulatory accumulation acts as a drag on growth. Draghi's report explicitly warned that the precautionary principle, enshrined in EU treaties, has become a brake on innovation. Letta's report highlighted how national barriers in services, digital and energy markets fragment the single market. Their presence at De Wever's summit signals that the competitiveness debate has moved from the margins to the centre of the European Council's agenda.
Commission retreat on AI rules
The European Commission's November 2025 proposals to amend the AI Act represent a remarkable climbdown for an institution that championed the legislation as a global benchmark. The changes would roll back certain documentation requirements for high-risk systems, extend compliance deadlines, and adjust the definition of what constitutes a high-risk application. Privacy rules under the GDPR would also be reformed to facilitate data sharing for AI training. The Commission framed the package as "targeted simplification" rather than deregulation, but the direction is unmistakable: the political cost of the AI Act's perceived impact on European competitiveness has forced a reassessment.
Parliament and the Council must still agree on any amendments. The European Parliament, which negotiated the original text, may resist dilution of provisions it fought hard to include, particularly on fundamental rights impact assessments and the ban on certain biometric surveillance practices. The Council, meanwhile, is divided: France and Germany have historically backed strong regulation, while Nordic and Baltic states tend to favour a lighter touch. De Wever's book and the summit are attempts to shift that balance.
The single market's unfinished business
De Wever's call for a "full-fledged capital markets union" and the removal of internal market barriers echoes three decades of European Council conclusions. The single market for goods functions reasonably well; services, digital and energy remain fragmented. National regulators still block cross-border mergers in telecoms and energy. Retail investors face different tax treatments and disclosure regimes across borders. The European Supervisory Authorities lack the powers to enforce consistent application of rules. Each of these is a sovereign competence that member states have been reluctant to pool.
The Draghi report estimated that completing the single market in services alone could add 2-3% to EU GDP over a decade. The Letta report put the cost of fragmentation in digital markets at €500 billion annually in lost potential. These are not marginal gains. Yet the political will to override national vetoes in tax, corporate law and financial supervision has evaporated since the eurozone crisis. De Wever's summit may produce a declaration, but without treaty change or qualified majority voting in new areas, implementation will remain at the mercy of national parliaments.
What the summit can and cannot deliver
Informal EU summits do not adopt legislation. They set political direction. The most concrete outcome next Thursday would be a mandate to the Commission to accelerate the AI Act simplification, to propose a capital markets union package with teeth, and to identify single market barriers that can be removed by qualified majority voting. De Wever will also push for a revision of the state aid guidelines to allow more public support for strategic sectors, a demand that pits him against the Commission's competition directorate and the frugal northern member states.
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European Commission · European Council · Belgian Federal Government