EU holds Xinjiang sanctions as China lifts measures on MEPs

The European Union will keep its sanctions on Chinese officials linked to human rights abuses in Xinjiang, refusing to follow Beijing's expected move to lift retaliatory measures against members of the European Parliament. The decision, confirmed on Thursday by the EU's diplomatic service, underscores a hardening stance in Brussels: symbolic gestures from China will not be enough to unlock a sanctions regime that has been in place for more than four years.

Anitta Hipper, spokeswoman for the European External Action Service (EEAS), told reporters that the Council of the European Union has seen no improvement in conditions in the far western region. "The EU has not observed changes in the human rights situation in China/Xinjiang. Therefore, the Council maintains the China/Xinjiang-related designations," she said. The statement makes clear that the EU's 27 member states, acting through the Council, are not prepared to treat the parliamentary sanctions issue as a standalone bargaining chip.

Asymmetric pressure and the parliamentary track

The development follows reports that China and the European Parliament are in the final stages of agreeing to lift the counter-sanctions Beijing imposed on a handful of MEPs, researchers and institutions in 2021. Those retaliatory measures, which included visa bans and asset freezes, targeted individuals such as Reinhard Bütikofer, chair of the Parliament's China delegation, and the Parliament's Subcommittee on Human Rights. The expected announcement could come within weeks, according to sources familiar with the talks.

For the Parliament, the lifting of sanctions on its own members is a matter of institutional dignity and political freedom. Several MEPs have been unable to travel to China or engage freely with Chinese counterparts since the measures took effect. The Parliament's leadership has pressed for their removal as a precondition for advancing broader EU-China files, including the long-stalled Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI). Yet the EEAS position creates a structural asymmetry: the Parliament may regain its operational freedom while the EU's substantive human rights sanctions remain fully in force.

Origins of the 2021 sanctions regime

The current standoff traces back to March 2021, when the EU joined the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada in a coordinated action targeting four Chinese officials and one entity. The Council listed Zhu Hailun, former deputy party secretary of Xinjiang; Wang Junzheng, party secretary of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps; Wang Mingshan, director of the Xinjiang Public Security Bureau; and Chen Mingguo, director of the Xinjiang Public Security Bureau at the time of designation. The Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps Public Security Bureau was the sole entity sanctioned.

The Council's implementing regulation cited "serious human rights violations in China, in particular large-scale arbitrary detentions and degrading treatment inflicted upon Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities." The measures comprised travel bans to the EU and asset freezes on funds and economic resources belonging to those listed. The EU's move was unprecedented: it was the first time the bloc had imposed human rights sanctions on Chinese officials since the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown.

China's retaliatory escalation

Beijing responded within days with its own list of ten European individuals and four entities, including MEPs, think-tank analysts and the Parliament's Subcommittee on Human Rights. The Chinese Foreign Ministry described the EU sanctions as based on "lies and disinformation" and vowed to "resolutely safeguard national sovereignty and interests." The tit-for-tat marked a sharp downturn in relations that had already been strained by Hong Kong, trade disputes and the pandemic.

The Chinese sanctions have had practical consequences. Affected MEPs have been barred from entering mainland China, Hong Kong and Macau. Their assets in China, if any, are frozen. Chinese citizens and institutions are prohibited from doing business with them. For the Parliament as an institution, the measures complicated delegation visits, inter-parliamentary exchanges and the work of the EU-China Parliamentary Association.

Why the EU refuses to reciprocate

Brussels' refusal to link the two sanctions tracks reflects a deliberate strategy. EU officials argue that the original designations were based on specific evidence of human rights violations documented by UN bodies, NGOs and independent researchers. The 2022 OHCHR assessment of human rights concerns in Xinjiang, while stopping short of using the term "genocide," found that "serious human rights violations" had been committed and that the extent of arbitrary detention may constitute crimes against humanity. That report remains the benchmark for the EU's position.

Diplomats in Brussels say the EU has communicated clear benchmarks for sanctions relief: the closure of so-called vocational education and training centres, the release of arbitrarily detained individuals, unrestricted access for independent observers, and an end to forced labour practices. None of those conditions, they say, have been met. Chinese authorities maintain the centres have been closed and that Xinjiang enjoys stability and prosperity, but they have not permitted unfettered access for international investigators.

The investment agreement remains frozen

The Comprehensive Agreement on Investment, concluded in principle at the end of 2020, has been in limbo since the sanctions exchange. The European Parliament froze its ratification process in May 2021, citing the Chinese counter-sanctions on MEPs as an unacceptable precondition. Even if the parliamentary sanctions are lifted, the CAI's prospects remain dim. Several member states, notably France and Germany, have signalled that human rights progress is a prerequisite for any revival. The European Commission has not forwarded the text for consent, effectively leaving the agreement in a diplomatic freezer.

Trade data shows the economic relationship has continued to deepen despite the political chill. EU goods imports from China reached a record €625 billion in 2023, while exports stood at €223 billion, according to Eurostat. The trade deficit widened to €402 billion. Investment flows have slowed but not stopped. The sanctions regime, limited to a handful of individuals and one entity, has not disrupted commercial ties at scale. That reality gives the EU political space to maintain the measures without immediate economic cost.

Divergent views within the EU

Not all member states view the sanctions with equal urgency. Countries in Central and Eastern Europe, many of which participate in the 14+1 or 16+1 cooperation formats with China, have occasionally pushed for a more pragmatic approach. Hungary, in particular, has argued for engagement over confrontation. Conversely, the Baltic states, the Netherlands and the Czech Republic have been vocal advocates for maintaining pressure. The Council operates by unanimity on sanctions designations, meaning any single member state could block a renewal or push for delisting. So far, that unity has held.

The European Parliament, for its part, has used its institutional leverage to keep the issue alive. Beyond the CAI freeze, MEPs have adopted resolutions calling for stronger due diligence legislation to address forced labour in supply chains, a measure that directly targets Xinjiang-related concerns. The Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive, adopted in 2024, and the Forced Labour Regulation, agreed in early 2025, both create legal frameworks that will affect companies sourcing from the region regardless of the sanctions list.

What happens next

The immediate focus shifts to the European Parliament's internal procedures. Once China formally lifts its sanctions, the Parliament will need to decide whether to treat the matter as resolved or to demand further concessions, such as the release of specific detained individuals or access for a parliamentary delegation to Xinjiang. The Conference of Presidents, the Parliament's governing body, is expected to discuss the issue in its next meeting. Meanwhile, the Council will review the EU's sanctions list at its next scheduled renewal, likely in late 2025. Unless the EEAS reports a material change in the human rights situation, the designations will be rolled over for another year.