Germany deepens defence ties with Turkey as NATO production gaps widen

Germany is accelerating defence cooperation with Turkey, treating Ankara as an indispensable industrial partner at a moment when NATO's European members face persistent shortfalls in ammunition and drone production. The shift marks a pragmatic reversal after years of political friction over Syria, human rights and the deployment of German assets at Incirlik air base.

A strategic necessity born of production gaps

Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 exposed the fragility of European defence supply chains. NATO's European members discovered that their combined manufacturing capacity could not sustain the rate of artillery consumption in a high-intensity conflict, nor replace lost air defence interceptors and precision-guided munitions at speed. As Turkish defence analyst Caglar Kurc put it, the war demonstrated that NATO has insufficient production, prompting a scramble for new industrial partners.

Berlin's answer has been to look south-east. With the second-largest standing army in NATO after the United States, Turkey offers both scale and recent combat experience. Its defence sector has expanded rapidly: in 2022, four Turkish firms, Baykar, Aselsan, Turkish Aerospace Industries and Roketsan, entered the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's list of the world's 100 largest arms companies for the first time. German media have begun referring to the sector as Turkey's new booming industry.

High-level political endorsement

The political signal was unmistakable when Chancellor Friedrich Merz met President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Ankara at the end of October 2025. Erdogan declared that Turkey would continue to cooperate closely with Germany. Weeks earlier, Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul told his hosts in Ankara that Berlin would be delighted if the two defence industries could cooperate, adding a rhetorical question that captured the mood: who else would Germany work with on this? The remarks reflect a calculation in the Chancellery and the Bendlerstrasse that Germany's network of reliable partners has shrunk in difficult geopolitical times, as a senior official at the German Armed Forces Procurement Office in Koblenz acknowledged on condition of anonymity.

That official described a world that suddenly seems relatively small given the trajectory of transatlantic relations, the war in Ukraine and the rise of China. NATO must assume a completely different role in the geopolitical arena, he said. Turkey is at least a strong NATO partner that is not in a bad position, and the two sides can learn from each other. The candour is notable: the same official conceded that Turkey is increasingly ruled by an authoritarian government and maintains good relations with both China and Russia, yet argued that maintaining NATO ties to Ankara is a strategic imperative.

Artillery ammunition and the Repkon deal

The most concrete project to date involves Repkon, a Turkish ammunition manufacturer that will begin producing 155 mm NATO-standard artillery shells in Germany from 2027. The calibre is the workhorse round for NATO howitzers, including those supplied to Ukraine. Turkish media hailed the arrangement as a technology transfer, though Kurc characterised that as an exaggeration while acknowledging its symbolic value. For Germany, the attraction is immediate capacity: Repkon's existing production lines can be replicated on German soil faster than building new ones from scratch.

The deal also illustrates a broader pattern. Turkey is positioning itself as both a cooperation partner and a potential market for the European arms industry, according to Benedikt Meng, a German defence expert with decades of industry experience. As one of NATO's largest partners and a key player in the Middle East and the Caucasus, deeper defence and industrial policy relations are definitely advantageous in terms of common security interests, he said.

Drone expertise and the Baykar-Leonardo venture

Turkey's most visible military export success has been its armed drones, notably the Bayraktar TB2 and the newer Akinci. They played a decisive role in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and have been used extensively in Ukraine. EU members Poland and Romania have already purchased them. In June 2025, Baykar and the Italian defence contractor Leonardo founded a joint venture, signalling European industry's willingness to integrate Turkish unmanned systems into joint programmes.

The Koblenz official said Germany should definitely take a look at Turkish drones, describing Ankara as quite advanced in this area and well worth talking to in the near future. Meng added that German technology, including sensors, is already being incorporated into TB2 drones, creating a de facto industrial interdependence that formal cooperation would only deepen. Kurc argued that while Europe is still implementing the multinational Eurodrone project, Turkey already fields two comparable systems; making use of those capabilities would strengthen European defence immediately rather than in the next decade.

Turkey's bid for EU defence financing

Ankara's ambitions extend beyond bilateral deals. In October 2025, the European Commission confirmed it had received a formal application from Turkey to participate in the Security Action for Europe programme, known as SAFE. The scheme aims to strengthen the European defence industrial base with loans totalling up to €150 billion. The application is under review, a Commission spokesperson said. If approved, Turkey would gain access to the same financing mechanisms as EU member states for eligible defence projects, a significant step for a non-member.

The SAFE programme, launched in 2024, is designed to address the fragmentation of European defence procurement by incentivising cross-border collaboration and scaling up production capacity. Turkey's inclusion would test the EU's willingness to treat a candidate country, whose accession talks have been effectively frozen since 2018, as a full industrial partner in the most sensitive area of strategic autonomy.

Human rights and the pragmatism calculation

The rapprochement has not erased the sources of tension. Germany moved its Tornado reconnaissance jets and a tanker aircraft from Incirlik to Jordan in 2017 after Ankara restricted access for German parliamentarians. Disagreements over Turkish military operations in northern Syria and the detention of German citizens persisted for years. More recently, criticism of Turkey's human rights record and democratic backsliding has been watered down in official German discourse.

The Koblenz official put the trade-off bluntly: of course, Turkey must initiate a process of democratisation, but let's be honest, what options do we have at the end of the day? We're not going to say to the US, 'We're no longer going to buy your weapons systems because you're deporting people.' The comparison is revealing: Berlin is applying a realist lens that treats alliance cohesion and industrial necessity as overriding values-based objections, at least for now.

What happens next

The European Commission's assessment of Turkey's SAFE application will be the first concrete test of the new relationship. A decision is expected in the first half of 2026. In parallel, German and Turkish officials are negotiating the scope of a bilateral defence industrial roadmap that could cover joint development of next-generation air defence missiles, naval systems and further drone integration. The Repkon factory in Germany must break ground in 2026 to meet the 2027 production target. Meanwhile, the Eurodrone programme, still years from initial operating capability, will continue to be measured against Turkish systems already in service. If Berlin's gamble pays off, the German-Turkish defence axis could become the template for how Europe engages capable non-EU partners without resolving the political contradictions that have stalled Turkey's accession for a decade.