The European Union has allocated less than one-fifth of the €300 billion RePowerEU programme designed to end its dependence on Russian fossil fuels, according to a European Court of Auditors study published this week. Just €54.3 billion has been earmarked by member states, even as Russian liquefied natural gas accounts for a growing share of EU imports.

The figures arrive at an uncomfortable moment. The EU is months away from a deadline to ban Russian LNG imports, with a broader prohibition on Russian gas due to take effect in 2027. Yet Russian LNG's share of EU imports climbed from 16% in the first half of 2025 to 19% in the first half of 2026, according to data from the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. The direction of travel is the opposite of what the policy intended.

A programme that never reached full speed

RePowerEU was launched in 2022, weeks after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, with the stated aim of phasing out Russian fossil fuel imports entirely. The €300 billion envelope was meant to fund the alternatives: renewable generation, grid interconnections, and energy efficiency improvements across the bloc.

Three and a half years on, the auditors' assessment is direct. EU funding, they conclude, contributes little to the phase-out of Russian oil and gas. Incentives for investment in clean energy and cross-border networks are insufficient. Effective steering for the exit from Russian energy is absent from the programme's design.

The shortfall is not a question of money being unavailable. Member states have simply not drawn down the funds. Whether the cause is administrative delay, a lack of matching national budgets, or insufficient political will in some capitals, the effect is the same: the programme conceived as the centrepiece of European energy independence is operating well below its intended capacity.

The Russian LNG paradox

Pipeline gas from Russia has fallen sharply since 2022. The near-complete halt of flows through Nord Stream and the drastic reduction through other routes was the most visible shift in European energy after the invasion. Those reductions were real and substantial.

LNG tells a different story. As pipeline volumes fell, the EU turned to seaborne gas, importing more from the United States and from Qatar. But Russian LNG did not stop. It grew. The Norwegian Institute of International Affairs reports that Russian LNG's share of EU imports rose three percentage points year on year.

Gas storage levels across the EU are currently low. With demand for LNG set to increase as winter approaches, Russian cargoes remain competitive on price. There is no sign of a reversal in the data.

The 2027 deadline under strain

In 2025, the EU adopted a permanent ban on Russian gas imports, scheduled to take effect in 2027. The deadline for LNG specifically falls on 31 December of this year.

The Court of Auditors' findings raise an immediate question: can the ban be implemented if the infrastructure and supply alternatives are not yet in place? Member states that continue to import Russian LNG, and that have drawn down little of the available RePowerEU funding, may face a choice between energy shortages and non-compliance with the ban.

Ursula von der Leyen, president of the European Commission, has repeatedly argued that exiting Russian energy would secure Europe's independence and drain what she called the "war chest" of Vladimir Putin. The import data suggest that argument has not yet been translated into practice.

Where the money stalled

The €300 billion figure for RePowerEU was always a combination of new money and repurposed existing funds. Not all of it was fresh spending. Even so, the gap between what was promised and what has been allocated is substantial.

Member states design their own recovery and resilience plans, which determine how EU funds are spent. Some have prioritised RePowerEU chapters; others have not. The auditors note that without stronger incentives or clearer requirements, there is little reason to expect a sudden acceleration in spending before the 2027 deadline.

Cross-border energy infrastructure has suffered in particular. Interconnectors that would allow gas or electricity to flow between member states in times of shortage require coordination between governments, which has been slow.

What the two numbers reveal

The 18% allocation rate matters because it measures intent, not just spending. If member states have only earmarked €54.3 billion, the remaining €245.7 billion has no project attached to it, no contractor, no timeline for delivery. Even if every euro were allocated tomorrow, the lag between commitment and completed infrastructure runs to years.

The 19% Russian LNG share measures actual, current dependence. It is not a forecast. It is the volume arriving at European terminals today, paying into Russian state revenues today, at a moment when the EU has committed to cutting that volume to zero within months.

The two figures together describe a policy that has been announced but not yet built. The ban remains on the statute book. The money to make it workable remains largely unspent. The gas keeps arriving.

People mentioned

Organisations

European Court of Auditors · European Commission · Norwegian Institute of International Affairs