EU roadmap targets Russian fossil fuel exit by 2027 but LNG loopholes persist

The European Commission has finally published its legislative roadmap to eliminate Russian fossil fuels from the EU energy mix by 2027, but the plan lands amid rising Russian LNG flows, deepening divisions among member states, and uncomfortable questions about the reliability of the American supplies that have replaced Russian gas. Energy Commissioner Dan Jorgensen presented the package in Strasbourg on Tuesday, framing it as the translation of political promises into binding law. "We've managed to put together a legislative package that will make sure that we will now get completely rid of Russian gas in our energy mix," he told DW.

A two-phase timeline with a qualified majority hurdle

The roadmap proposes a ban on new gas contracts with Russian suppliers by the end of 2025, followed by a complete phase-out of remaining imports by 2027. Unlike previous sanction packages, which required unanimity, this legislative package needs only a qualified majority in the Council, 55% of member states representing 65% of the EU population. That lowers the threshold but does not remove the political risk. Hungary, Slovakia and Austria, all still dependent on Russian pipeline gas, have blocked or watered down similar measures in the past. The Commission's calculation is that the qualified majority route makes adoption feasible, though the vote has not yet been scheduled.

The financial stakes are considerable. According to Eurostat, the EU spent €23 billion on Russian fossil fuels in 2024, a direct contribution to the Kremlin's war budget. Yet overall fossil fuel imports from Russia have not collapsed as quickly as the 2022 REPowerEU plan envisioned. Russian gas still accounted for 17.5, 19% of total EU gas imports last year, depending on the methodology used. The share has fallen from pre-war highs, but the trajectory has flattened.

The LNG loophole and France's growing role

A central weakness of the EU's sanctions architecture has been the treatment of liquefied natural gas. Until March 2025, Russian LNG was excluded from sanction packages entirely. The Commission then adopted a regulation banning Russian LNG transshipments through European ports to third countries, but imports for domestic EU consumption remained untouched. That distinction has allowed trade to continue, and in some cases expand. Data from the International Energy Agency and the European LNG Tracker maintained by the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA) show that Russian LNG enters the EU primarily through terminals in France, Belgium and Spain.

France stands out. Its advanced regasification infrastructure enabled an 81% increase in Russian LNG imports in 2024, costing €2.68 billion. Ana Maria Jaller-Makarewicz, an energy analyst at IEEFA, sees a structural problem: "Once it's in the network, you can't trace it. That benefits both the exporter and the buyer." The concern is that Russian gas, once regasified and injected into the French grid, loses its origin label and can be re-exported to neighbouring countries as generic European supply. That undermines both the spirit of the sanctions and the transparency of the EU's own energy statistics.

Swapping one dependency for another

The United States has become the EU's dominant LNG supplier, a shift the Commission welcomes. Jorgensen dismissed concerns about American reliability, telling DW he would "struggle to find any supply in the world that is as bad as Russia." Pawel Czyzak, a senior analyst at the UK-based think tank Ember, takes a different view. "What the EU has done is switching from one risky supplier to the next," he said. "The US is using its position of power to pressure Europe to buy gas, and even threatens tariffs when it doesn't comply. Since the inauguration of Donald Trump, it's difficult to assess whether the US can still be treated as a reliable partner."

The numbers bear out the shift. US LNG now accounts for the largest single share of EU imports, but the commercial terms are negotiated cargo by cargo, often linked to Henry Hub pricing plus liquefaction and shipping costs. That exposes European buyers to North American market dynamics and political risk in a way that long-term pipeline contracts with Russia, for all their geopolitical toxicity, did not. The Commission argues that diversification across multiple LNG exporters, including Qatar, Algeria and Norway, reduces concentration risk. Critics counter that the infrastructure required to receive and regasify LNG locks in gas demand for decades, crowding out the electrification and efficiency gains the Green Deal requires.

Prices remain elevated, industry feels the squeeze

European gas prices tell their own story. The Title Transfer Facility (TTF) benchmark, the continent's reference price, climbed from €30 to €48 per megawatt-hour in 2024, a 59% increase. Prices have eased slightly with the end of the heating season but remain well above the pre-war average of roughly €20/MWh. For energy-intensive industries, chemicals, steel, fertilisers, ceramics, the gap with US and Chinese competitors has widened. The European Central Bank has repeatedly flagged energy costs as a drag on euro-area manufacturing competitiveness. Households, too, face sustained pressure: gas still heats roughly 40% of EU homes, and retail tariffs adjust slowly to wholesale movements.

Both Czyzak and Jaller-Makarewicz argue that the only durable solution is reducing gas demand rather than shuffling suppliers. Jaller-Makarewicz points to the residential sector, where better insulation and heat pumps could cut a significant slice of consumption. The political difficulty is illustrated by the backlash against Germany's heating law, which attempted to mandate heat pump installation in new and renovated buildings. The law was diluted after public opposition, a reminder that efficiency measures require consent, not just regulation.

Divisions in the Council and the shadow of US diplomacy

The roadmap now moves to the member states. A qualified majority vote is expected in the coming months, but the political landscape is shifting. Behind closed doors, discussions of a US-brokered ceasefire in Ukraine have included the possibility of sanctions relief for Russia. If the Trump administration pushes for a rapid normalisation of energy trade as part of a peace deal, the EU's resolve could fracture. Hungary and Slovakia have already signalled openness to restoring Russian pipeline flows if a ceasefire holds. Austria's OMV continues to receive Russian gas under a long-term contract that runs until 2040, though it has said it will not renew.

Jaller-Makarewicz underscored the strategic imperative: "Only if member states manage to stand together, the bloc can strengthen the union while offering security of supply." That unity is far from guaranteed. The Commission's own impact assessment, circulated to capitals in April, acknowledges that a full phase-out by 2027 would require accelerated deployment of renewables, hydrogen infrastructure and demand-side measures that are currently behind schedule. The REPowerEU target of 45% renewable energy by 2030 is already considered ambitious; adding a hard deadline for Russian gas exit compresses the timeline further.

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