Hungary's Tisza government submits anti-corruption package to unlock frozen EU funds

Sixty days after Hungary's April election delivered a two-thirds parliamentary majority to Péter Magyar's Tisza party, the new government has laid its legislative cards on the table. On 9 June, a 109-page anti-corruption package landed in parliament, the centrepiece of a strategy to unlock the €22 billion in EU cohesion funds that have been frozen since the European Commission triggered the rule-of-law conditionality mechanism in 2022. The legislation is explicit about its purpose: it is designed to satisfy the 27 "super milestones", mostly anti-corruption and rule-of-law reforms, that successive Orbán governments negotiated but never fully implemented.

Asset declarations finally get teeth

For years, the asset declarations filed by Hungarian politicians were a running joke in Budapest. The clearest example was Viktor Orbán himself. The declaration he submitted on 9 May listed two properties and savings of 9.127 million forints (roughly €25,000) in a joint account with his wife, against a monthly prime ministerial salary above 7 million forints (€19,000). No shares, no investment funds, no valuable movable assets. The discrepancy between declared wealth and visible lifestyle fuelled speculation for more than a decade.

The new rules change the calculus entirely. Politicians must now disclose not only their assets but the origin of their wealth. The obligation extends to leaders of state-funded political parties and to family members living in the same household, a provision that catches Orbán even though he did not take up his parliamentary mandate after the election. Failure to file carries a one-year prison sentence; omitting significant information or making false declarations carries up to two years. The Integrity Authority, previously a watchdog with limited bite, gains the power to launch detailed inquiries and to initiate proceedings that can remove office holders from their posts.

Public procurement: the transparent economic actor

Public procurement was the engine of Fidesz-linked wealth accumulation. From motorway construction to stadium building, state contracts flowed to a circle of businessmen whose companies grew into sprawling empires. The Tisza package introduces the category of a "transparent economic actor": only companies with publicly identifiable ownership structures may compete for public tenders. The measure is aimed at piercing the corporate veils, often layers of offshore holding companies, that obscured the true beneficiaries of state spending.

This procurement reform is twinned with anti-money laundering provisions. The government intends to act against private equity funds into which Orbán-associated oligarchs allegedly moved enormous fortunes, likely several billion euros, while concealing beneficial ownership. The Hungarian investigative outlet 444 has reported that several provisions in the package would force the owners of these funds into the open. If enforced, the rules would represent the most serious attempt yet to map the hidden financial architecture built during the Orbán era.

Going beyond Brussels' checklist

Prime minister Péter Magyar has said the government plans to introduce stricter rules in several areas than those originally required by the European Commission. That claim matters. The 27 super milestones were the product of protracted negotiation between Budapest and Brussels, and they represented a compromise: enough reform to satisfy the conditionality regulation, but calibrated to preserve the core of the Fidesz patronage system. By exceeding the milestones, Magyar signals two things. First, that the new government believes the Commission's benchmarks were insufficient to dismantle the structures of corruption. Second, that it wants to pre-empt any accusation from Brussels that Hungary is doing the bare minimum.

The Commission's assessment of the package will be the first real test. In 2023, the von der Leyen Commission released €10.2 billion in pre-financing for Hungary's recovery plan after judging that certain milestones had been met, only to keep the bulk of cohesion funds blocked. That decision drew criticism from the European Parliament and from rule-of-law NGOs, who argued the reforms were cosmetic. The Tisza government is betting that a visibly tougher package forces a different outcome.

The Integrity Authority's new mandate

The empowerment of the Integrity Authority is arguably the most consequential institutional change. Under Fidesz, the body was starved of resources and its leadership appointed on political criteria. The new legislation gives it investigative powers that resemble those of a prosecutor's office: it can compel testimony, seize documents, and refer cases for prosecution. Crucially, it can initiate proceedings to remove office holders, a mechanism that could reach mayors, heads of state-owned companies, and regulators who owe their positions to the previous regime.

Whether the Authority operates independently will depend on its leadership and budget. The government has promised a transparent appointment process and adequate funding, but the institution will face immediate pressure from entrenched networks in local government and state-owned enterprises. Its first cases will set the tone.

Fidesz in disarray, but not defeated

The source reporting notes that the defeated Fidesz movement "struggles to come to terms with an unexpected loss." That is an understatement. Fidesz governed for 14 years, rewrote the constitution, captured the media landscape, and built a patronage system that reached into every village. Its parliamentary group remains large, its local government networks intact, and its media outlets, though diminished, still command audiences. The party has already signalled it will challenge the legislation in the Constitutional Court, where judges appointed during the Orbán era hold a majority.

There is also the question of political retaliation. The source mentions "battles over state institutions and allegations of political retaliation" deepening divisions. Magyar's government will need to walk a narrow line: pursuing genuine corruption without allowing the process to be portrayed as a partisan purge. The prison sentences attached to asset declaration offences are a powerful tool, but they also hand the opposition a narrative of authoritarian overreach if applied selectively.

The Brussels timeline

The European Commission's assessment process is not instant. Once Hungary formally notifies the legislative changes, which requires parliamentary passage and presidential signature, the Commission has two months to adopt a decision on whether the milestones are satisfied. That timeline pushes any fund release into autumn at the earliest. Meanwhile, Hungary's budget is under strain. The frozen funds represent roughly 10% of GDP; their absence has forced spending cuts and contributed to a fiscal deficit that exceeded 6% of GDP in 2025.

The Commission will also scrutinise implementation, not just legislation. Hungary has a history of passing laws that satisfy Brussels on paper while leaving enforcement hollow. The public procurement rules, for instance, require a functioning register of beneficial owners and a procurement authority willing to exclude non-compliant bidders. The asset declaration regime needs an Integrity Authority with the capacity to verify thousands of filings. Laws are the easy part; the administrative machinery is where reform lives or dies.