Russian sabotage attacks in Europe near triple as readiness gap widens

European governments recorded 34 Russian state-sponsored sabotage attacks in 2024, a figure that almost triples the annual rate seen in preceding years. The surge marks a quantitative shift in a campaign that has moved beyond occasional disruption into sustained pressure on infrastructure, industry and the sinews of military support for Ukraine.

Transport networks absorbed the largest share, accounting for over a quarter of all incidents. Defence suppliers were the next most frequent target: BAE Systems, Rheinmetall, the German Diehl Group and EMCO have each been struck in recent years. The pattern is deliberate. Attackers probe perceived weaknesses in societal structures, supply chains and government premises, testing not only physical defences but the willingness and capacity of European nations to respond collectively.

The scale and nature of Russian hybrid operations

The 2024 total is not an anomaly. Researchers at RAND Europe note that the number of documented attacks continued to increase through 2025. The operations are hybrid by design: cyber intrusions, physical sabotage, disinformation and the weaponisation of irregular migration blend into a single campaign. Belarus has acted as a conduit for the latter, pushing migrants toward the Polish and Baltic borders in coordinated waves that strain border agencies and asylum systems.

Each incident serves a dual purpose. Material damage is the visible outcome; the less visible aim is to expose fractures in European coordination, to measure response times, and to erode public confidence in the state's ability to protect critical services. The cumulative effect is a stress test of the continent's resilience, conducted without a formal declaration of war.

Uneven preparedness across Europe

The response to this stress test varies sharply. Finland, Sweden, Norway, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Germany have embedded preparedness into national consciousness. Their frameworks extend beyond military scenarios to cover cross-border coordination against novel physical threats and pre-emptive resilience against hybrid pressures. In these countries, the memory of Soviet occupation or the proximity of the Russian border has kept civil defence structures alive, even during the post-Cold War drawdown.

Western Europe presents a different picture. Defence budgets have risen year on year, yet the frameworks governing how that money translates into crisis readiness remain underdeveloped. The gap is not merely financial. It is structural: the absence of standing mechanisms to mobilise industry, to allocate scarce skills, and to coordinate civilian participation when a crisis arrives. Without those mechanisms, higher spending yields diminishing returns.

The private sector's indispensable role

Energy providers, food retailers, transport operators and their supply chains hold the infrastructure and workforce that any wartime economy depends on. Governments that engage proactively with these sectors enable businesses to plan for personnel, procurement and continuity. The alternative, improvisation after the fact, guarantees delay and duplication.

France has taken a step in this direction with its industrial reserve, a pool of former defence industry personnel available for mobilisation in a national crisis. The concept is straightforward: identify critical occupations, maintain a register, and reduce the lag between mobilisation order and effective production. Other nations are watching the French experiment closely, though few have replicated it at scale.

Lessons from Ukraine's wartime mobilisation

Ukraine offers the most comprehensive case study of public-private collaboration under fire. Since the invasion began, both sectors have worked to repair telecommunications and critical infrastructure networks, often within hours of damage. A government relocation scheme launched in March 2022 supported 745 enterprises in moving operations to western Ukraine, preserving industrial capacity and employment. The scheme's speed, designed and executed in weeks, reflects a level of pre-existing coordination that most European governments have yet to build.

The Ukrainian experience also underscores a point often missed in Western capitals: resilience is not a static stockpile but a dynamic capability. It requires continuous exercising, clear legal authority for requisition, and compensation mechanisms that keep private firms solvent when they are redirected to state priorities. These elements are legislative as much as logistical.

France's industrial reserve and the framework gap

The French model illustrates the broader argument. Real increases in defence spending matter, but the frameworks governing deployment of that spending will make or break a nation's crisis response. A budget without a mobilisation plan is a warehouse without a loading dock. The reserve addresses one narrow slice, skilled labour for defence production, but the same logic applies to energy engineers, logistics specialists, medical staff and cyber operators.

European spending on defence continues to rise, as Eurostat data confirms, yet the absence of comprehensive frameworks across much of the continent undermines the aggregate impact. The disparity is not uniform. It maps closely onto the geopolitical divide between states that lived under Soviet influence and those that did not.

The Nordic model and the challenge for Western Europe

The Nordic concept of Total Defence provides a working blueprint. It integrates military defence, civil defence, economic resilience and psychological preparedness into a single doctrine backed by legislation, regular exercises and public communication. Sweden's 2018 reintroduction of conscription and Finland's continuous investment in shelter infrastructure are visible manifestations. Less visible but equally critical are the legal frameworks that allow the state to direct private resources in a crisis, and the cultural expectation that every citizen has a role.

Translating this model to Western Europe requires more than imitation. The legal traditions, federal structures and public attitudes differ. Germany's federal system, for instance, distributes civil protection responsibilities across Länder, complicating national coordination. France's centralised tradition offers a different set of levers. The task is to adapt the principles, whole-of-society participation, peacetime preparation for wartime legal authorities, incentivised civilian engagement, to each national context.

Building a collective ethos of resilience

Effective preparedness ultimately depends on having the right people in the right place when needed. That outcome does not emerge spontaneously. It requires cooperation mechanisms between government, industry and society that not only mandate but also incentivise and compensate civilian participation. Regulatory frameworks and financial instruments must promote engagement from individuals and communities up to large corporations and public institutions.

Clear communication is the foundation. Populations that understand the threat and their role in the response are more likely to accept the inconveniences of preparedness, stockpiling, drills, data sharing, reserve service. Leaders across government, industry, the military and civil society must articulate a collective ethos that frames resilience as a shared responsibility rather than a state service. The alternative is a continent that spends more each year on defence while remaining structurally fragile when the test arrives.