The chief executive of Siemens Energy has warned that Germany is being hit harder by attacks on its energy infrastructure than other European countries, and that the threat has grown sharply over the past 18 months. Christian Bruch told the Deutsche Presse-Agentur on 4 September that both physical sabotage and cyber incidents were rising, and that Germany was insufficiently prepared to repair damage quickly.
A CEO's unusually blunt assessment
Corporate leaders in Germany tend to choose their words carefully on matters of national security. Bruch, who runs one of the country's largest energy technology companies, did not. "We must recognise that critical infrastructure cannot be fully protected," he said. "In my view, the threat level has increased markedly over the last 12 to 18 months."
The claim carries weight because of Siemens Energy's position. The company, which spun off from the Siemens group in 2020 and employs roughly 103,000 people worldwide including 27,000 in Germany, designs, manufactures and supplies technology for power generation and transmission. It sits close enough to the infrastructure in question to have a clear view of what is happening on the ground.
Why Germany is more exposed
Bruch's argument about Germany's vulnerability is geographical as much as anything else. "We are particularly exposed as a large country that would be a transit country in a conflict and plays a key role," he said. "We need to be aware of that. And the public should be aware of it too."
Germany sits at the centre of European energy networks. Its gas pipelines, electricity interconnectors and grid infrastructure serve not just domestic consumers but also neighbouring states. Disrupting German infrastructure would have cascading effects across the continent, a fact that makes it a logical target for any actor seeking to pressure Europe as a whole.
The Brandenburg and North Rhine-Westphalia incidents
Bruch pointed to recent attacks on the power grid in Brandenburg and North Rhine-Westphalia as evidence. Investigators have concluded that both incidents amounted to anti-constitutional sabotage, a term German authorities use for politically motivated attacks on the democratic order. The details of the Brandenburg case, which involved rocket-like devices found near grid infrastructure, have drawn particular attention.
These are not isolated events. German security officials have warned for months that the country's energy assets face an elevated risk of sabotage, with suspicion frequently directed at Russian-linked actors. The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution has repeatedly flagged hybrid threats including infrastructure attacks as a growing concern.
The repair gap
Bruch's most striking point was not about protection but about recovery. "We need to ensure that we can repair damage quickly," he said. "Today, we would not be sufficiently prepared for that." The legal framework exists, he added, but the operational capability does not.
He pointed to Ukraine as a model. Ukrainian energy companies have developed rapid repair teams, fast reporting chains and pre-positioned spare parts to restore power after Russian missile strikes. Bruch argued that Germany needs something similar: not just guards and firewalls, but the organisational capacity to get the lights back on when defences fail.
"That is much more important than believing I can protect everything," he said. The remark is a quiet challenge to the common assumption in German policy circles that regulation and hardening can keep critical systems safe. Bruch is suggesting that some failures are inevitable and that the focus should shift toward resilience.
Cyber attacks rising in parallel
Physical sabotage is only part of the picture. "Incidents are increasing, and on the cyber side the frequency of attacks on infrastructure is rising markedly," Bruch said. The comment aligns with reporting from Germany's domestic intelligence agencies, which have documented a sustained increase in cyber intrusions targeting energy operators.
Energy infrastructure faces a dual threat: physical attacks on substations, cables and pipelines, and digital attacks on control systems. The two can be combined. A cyber intrusion that disables monitoring could make a physical attack harder to detect and respond to. Bruch's reference to hybrid attacks was explicit: "We must accept that all of this can be signs of hybrid attacks."
A self-inflicted vulnerability
One of Bruch's more pointed observations concerned something surprisingly mundane: signage. Germany, he noted, has a habit of labelling its critical infrastructure visibly. "I don't need to write 'Attention, important switching installation' on every important piece of infrastructure," he said. "We do that very visibly in Germany. That is not necessarily ideal."
The remark captures a tension in German infrastructure planning. Transparency and public information requirements, often rooted in safety regulation, can inadvertently assist anyone planning an attack. A sign identifying a key substation is convenient for maintenance crews. It is also convenient for saboteurs.
The civil operations plan
Bruch called for the rapid completion of Germany's civil operations plan, a framework for responding to crises that would cover energy and water infrastructure as well as food supply. The plan has been under discussion for some time, but progress has been slow. Bruch's intervention adds business pressure to what has so far been largely a bureaucratic process.
Germany's approach to civil defence has been shaped by decades of relative peace. The country's emergency planning infrastructure was allowed to wither after the Cold War, and rebuilding it has proved politically and administratively difficult. Russia's war in Ukraine changed the strategic picture, but translating that change into operational readiness takes time and money.
People mentioned
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Christian Bruch
Organisations
Siemens Energy
