Landslide in Saxony-Anhalt leaves firewall intact but shaken
The Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) captured 44% of the vote in Sunday's Saxony-Anhalt state election, a result that would have been unthinkable five years ago. The party fell just short of the absolute majority it needed to form the first far-right state government since the Nazi era, but the scale of its victory has sent a jolt through German politics. In 2021 the AfD won 20% in the same state; the doubling of its support reflects a trajectory that mirrors the rise of hard-right forces across the continent.
Germany's domestic intelligence agency classifies the AfD's Saxony-Anhalt branch as "extreme right", a designation that makes the party's performance historically anomalous. No other EU member state has seen a party with that official label come so close to governing a regional legislature. The Brandmauer, the informal agreement among mainstream parties to exclude the AfD from coalitions, held, but the margin was razor-thin.
Brandmauer under pressure as far-right normalisation spreads
Germany remains one of the few European countries where a cordon sanitaire against the far right still operates at both federal and state levels. In Italy, Sweden and the Netherlands, right-wing parties have entered government or provide parliamentary support to minority cabinets, often arguing that their far-right partners have moderated. That argument is harder to sustain in Germany, where the AfD's most successful branches are also its most radical.
The result will intensify the debate inside the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) about whether the firewall is sustainable. Some CDU parliamentarians in Saxony-Anhalt have reportedly considered defecting to give the AfD a majority, a move that would shatter the consensus. Meanwhile, calls for a formal ban on the AfD are growing louder, though legal scholars warn that a ban could trigger a backlash far beyond the state's borders.
Bans and cooperation both carry democratic risks
Both strategies, banning the AfD or absorbing it into coalitions, rest on a limited diagnosis. A ban treats the symptom while ignoring the causes: a growing share of voters who feel unrepresented by mainstream parties. Cooperation, as seen in Sweden and Italy, has not tamed radical rhetoric; it has legitimised it. In both cases, the underlying fragmentation of party systems makes stable government harder, feeding the very dissatisfaction that fuels far-right growth.
The average far-right vote share across Europe now sits around 25%, according to aggregated national election data. That is a dramatic increase from the low single digits recorded in the early 2010s. The trend is not confined to the east or the south; it is structural, driven by economic inequality, housing shortages, climate anxiety and a perception that mainstream parties offer managerialism rather than vision.
Mainstream parties must offer more than fear
Mudde argues that democratic politicians have fallen into a trap: they campaign on being the lesser evil, mobilising voters against the far right rather than for a positive programme. That strategy is unsustainable. When turnout drops, the far right's committed base delivers a disproportionate share of the vote, turning a minority of the electorate into a parliamentary majority.
The alternative is a collective effort to strengthen liberal democratic institutions, independent judiciaries, regulated digital platforms, transparent party financing, while addressing the material concerns that drive voters toward extremes. That means serious policies on housing supply, public investment, income inequality and climate action, not just rhetoric on migration and crime. It also means accepting that in fragmented parliaments no single party will implement its full manifesto.
Time running out for democratic renewal
The next test arrives in two weeks when Mecklenburg-Vorpommern votes. Polls suggest the AfD could again exceed 30%. France's presidential election next year presents a similar dynamic. The window for mainstream parties to rebuild trust is narrowing. As Mudde notes, the democratic struggle becomes harder and less fair once the far right establishes power, as seen in Hungary and the United States.
The task is not merely to block the AfD but to reconstruct a political offer that commands majority support on its own merits. That requires realism from politicians, journalists and voters alike: no party will achieve its full agenda, but the shared goal of preserving liberal democracy must override partisan advantage. The Brandenburg state election in 2027 and the federal election in 2029 will reveal whether that lesson has been learned.
People mentioned
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Cas Mudde
Organisations
Alternative für Deutschland · Christian Democratic Union
