EU ministers agree weakened 2040 climate target and 2035 goal ahead of COP30

European Union environment ministers emerged from marathon negotiations in the early hours of Wednesday with a climate package that avoids the embarrassment of arriving empty handed at the COP30 summit opening in Brazil on 10 November, but only by watering down the bloc's 2040 ambition and leaning heavily on international carbon credits.

The 2035 milestone and its limits

The centrepiece of the agreement is a new 2035 target range of 66.25 percent to 72.5 percent net emissions reductions compared with 1990 levels. This is not legally binding. It functions as a political signal and a policy compass for the next five years, roughly mirroring the informal position the EU presented at the UN General Assembly in New York in September. The width of the range, more than six percentage points, reflects the difficulty of reconciling member states with vastly different energy mixes and industrial bases.

Because the 2035 figure is not enshrined in law, it does not trigger the compliance mechanisms of the European Climate Law. That law, adopted in 2021, makes the 2030 target of at least 55 percent and the 2050 net-zero goal legally binding, and requires the Commission to propose a 2040 target. The 2035 marker is a new addition, inserted to satisfy the Paris Agreement's requirement for a successive nationally determined contribution every five years. The EU's current NDC covers 2030; the next must cover 2035. Ministers have now provided the political backbone for that submission.

The 2040 target: legally binding but credit-dependent

The headline figure for 2040 is an 85 percent net reduction, which is legally binding once the European Parliament and Council complete the legislative process. However, the deal mandates that 5 percentage points of that reduction be achieved by purchasing international carbon credits, effectively outsourcing abatement to projects outside the EU. On top of that, national governments will be allowed to use credits to cover a further 5 percentage points of their individual effort-sharing obligations.

That means the domestic effort required within the EU's borders could be as low as 75 percent, with the remaining 10 percentage points met through the international market. The architecture recalls the Kyoto Protocol's clean development mechanism, which fell into disrepute over additionality and permanence concerns. The EU has since built its own emissions trading system (ETS) as the primary domestic instrument, but the decision to reopen the door to international credits signals a pragmatic shift: ministers judged that a higher headline number with flexibility was politically achievable where a tighter domestic-only target was not.

Review clause and the ETS2 delay

A wide-ranging review clause was inserted at the insistence of several central and eastern European capitals. It allows the EU to adjust the 2040 target in the future if climate policy is judged to have negative impacts on the EU's economy. The wording is broad enough to cover competitiveness, energy prices, or industrial relocation, issues that have dominated the political debate since the energy crisis of 2022. Critics argue the clause creates regulatory uncertainty for investors; supporters say it provides a necessary safety valve.

The agreement also foresees a one-year delay to the implementation of the EU's second emissions trading system (ETS2), which extends carbon pricing to heating fuels and road transport. Originally set to launch in 2026, it will now start in 2027. The delay responds to concerns about social acceptance and administrative readiness, particularly in member states where housing stock is poorly insulated and public transport alternatives are limited. The Commission had warned that a delay would reduce the system's cumulative emissions impact, but ministers prioritised political manageability.

A fractured consensus

The voting pattern reveals the fault lines. Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Poland did not support the 2040 deal. All four have carbon-intensive power sectors and significant mining or heavy industry employment. Bulgaria and Belgium abstained, Belgium because its federal structure makes it difficult to commit to binding targets without regional agreement, Bulgaria citing economic vulnerability. The remaining 21 member states backed the package, enough for the qualified majority required under the Council's voting rules, but the opposition bloc represents a substantial share of the EU's remaining coal use and a political constituency that has grown more vocal since the 2024 European elections.

The divisions are not new. They echo the negotiations over the 2030 climate and energy framework in 2014 and the Fit for 55 package in 2021-23. What has changed is the political weight of the sceptics. The European Conservatives and Reformists group, which includes Poland's Law and Justice and the Czech ODS, gained seats in the last Parliament. National governments in Budapest, Bratislava and Prague have made opposition to "green overreach" a defining feature of their EU engagement. The unanimous approval of the overall package, including the 2035 range and the ETS2 delay, was only possible because the 2040 target itself was adopted by qualified majority, not unanimity.

Next steps: Parliament and the trilogue

The Council's general approach now moves to the European Parliament, where the environment committee (ENVI) will draft a report and the plenary will vote on a negotiating mandate. MEPs have historically pushed for higher ambition. In March 2024, a non-binding resolution backed by a cross-party majority called for a 90 to 95 percent reduction by 2040, with domestic action prioritised over international credits. The Parliament's final position is likely to be stricter than the Council's on both the headline number and the credit limits.

Once the Parliament adopts its position, probably in early 2026, the two institutions will enter trilogue negotiations mediated by the Commission. The key battlegrounds will be the share of international credits allowed, the scope of the review clause, and whether the 2035 range should be narrowed or made binding. The Commission, as guardian of the treaties and the Paris Agreement, will try to keep the final text aligned with the EU's fair share of the global carbon budget. The Council presidency, Poland in the first half of 2025, Denmark in the second, will steer the Council's line. A final law could be on the statute books by mid-2026, in time for the EU to submit its formal 2035 NDC before the COP31 deadline.

COP30 and the international signal

The immediate driver for this week's all-night session was the calendar. COP30 opens in Belém on 10 November. Under the Paris Agreement, parties are expected to communicate their 2035 NDCs by February 2025. The EU has traditionally positioned itself as the standard-bearer for climate ambition, using its internal unity to leverage action from the US, China and India. Arriving in Brazil without a 2035 number would have undermined that role. The compromise allows the Commission to submit a credible NDC on behalf of the bloc, even if the 2040 target remains subject to legislative finalisation.

International observers will scrutinise the credit provisions. The Paris Agreement's Article 6 rules on cooperative approaches, finalised at COP29 in Baku, set guardrails on corresponding adjustments and avoidance of double counting. The EU's decision to mandate 5 percent of its 2040 target through international credits, and permit another 5 percent nationally, will test those rules at scale. If the EU becomes a major buyer, it could drive up prices in the voluntary carbon market and shape the development of Article 6 registries. Conversely, if the credits prove environmentally weak, the EU's credibility as a climate leader will suffer.