Hungary's Magyar visits Poland to reset relations after Orban era

Peter Magyar's decision to make Poland the destination of his first state visit, just ten days after his inauguration on 9 May 2026, carries more diplomatic weight than the usual courtesy call. The leader of the centre-right Tisza Party, who swept to victory in Hungary's 12 April parliamentary election, has framed the trip as a return to 'our natural allies'. In Warsaw, the language is equally warm. Marcin Bosacki, state secretary at the Polish foreign ministry, described the visit as 'symbolic' and 'a powerful symbolic gesture that friendship with Poland is important.'

From illiberal axis to frozen relations

The warmth marks a sharp rupture from the preceding sixteen years. Under Viktor Orban's Fidesz government (2010, 2026) and Poland's Law and Justice (PiS) administration (2015, 2023), Budapest and Warsaw formed what analysts called an illiberal, EU-critical axis. They coordinated vetoes on rule-of-law conditionality, migration quotas and climate targets. But the alliance frayed after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Orban's refusal to endorse strong EU sanctions, his maintenance of energy ties with Moscow and his blocking of military aid corridors through Hungarian territory were never matched by Warsaw, even under PiS.

When Donald Tusk returned as Polish prime minister in December 2023, relations hit what he later called rock bottom. 'Everything is clear between us, we have different views on every matter, on every issue,' Tusk told Polish reporters in October 2025. He accused Orban of opposing democratic norms and judicial transparency. The breach widened when Hungary granted political asylum to Zbigniew Ziobro, Poland's former justice minister, and his deputy Marcin Romanowski. Both face corruption investigations in Poland; their presence in Budapest became a standing irritant in bilateral talks.

The asylum complication

Magyar arrives in Warsaw without the one concession Polish officials most want: the return of Ziobro and Romanowski. According to Polish diplomatic sources, both men left Hungary in the days before Magyar's swearing-in, presumably facilitated by the outgoing Fidesz apparatus. The new prime minister cannot hand over what has already departed. This limits the immediate goodwill he can generate, even as he signals a clean break. Edit Zgut-Przybylska, a sociologist at the Polish Academy of Sciences and the CEU Democracy Institute in Budapest, told DW: 'The trust that was destroyed by the pro-Russian and extremely anti-European policies of the former Hungarian government must be restored.'

EU funds: the practical prize

Beyond symbolism, both leaders have a concrete interest in the European Commission's coffers. Tusk's government unlocked €137 billion in cohesion and recovery funds that had been frozen over rule-of-law disputes with the previous PiS administration. The mechanism, linking disbursement to judicial independence milestones, is the same one that has kept roughly €22 billion in cohesion funds and €10.4 billion in recovery grants out of Hungary's reach since 2022. Magyar has made recovery of those funds a centrepiece of his economic programme. Tusk's recent experience navigating the Commission's conditionality checks offers a ready-made playbook.

The numbers are not abstract. Hungary's 2025 budget assumed €4.2 billion in EU reimbursements that never arrived; the fiscal hole contributed to a 5.4% deficit that forced Orban's government into ad hoc tax hikes on retailers and telecoms operators. Magyar's finance minister, Márton Nagy, has told parliament that restoring the full flow could shave 1.5 percentage points off the deficit within two years. The Commission's mid-term review of the 2021, 2027 multiannual financial framework, due in autumn 2026, will be the first test of whether Budapest's new commitments translate into released tranches.

Ukraine aid and the blocked reimbursement

A second financial dispute sits on the agenda. Orban's government blocked an European Peace Facility reimbursement of nearly two billion Polish zloty, about €471 million at current rates, for military equipment Poland supplied to Ukraine in 2022 and 2023. Bosacki called it a 'shameful decision'. The facility requires unanimous approval for each tranche; Hungary's veto held up the entire payout. Magyar has indicated he will lift the block, a move that would simultaneously unblock funds for other member states and demonstrate his pro-European credentials to Brussels.

The gesture carries domestic risk. Fidesz, now in opposition but still polling above 30%, frames the veto as defence of Hungarian sovereignty and a brake on escalation. Magyar's coalition includes voters who backed Orban's scepticism about military involvement. He will need to explain why Hungarian taxpayers should reimburse Polish weapons deliveries without appearing to simply obey Brussels.

Common ground on migration and climate

Ideological convergence exists elsewhere. Since taking office in December 2023, Tusk has shifted right on migration, endorsing temporary border controls and a harder line on asylum applications, positions Magyar campaigned on. On climate policy, both governments now argue that the EU's 2040 emissions targets must account for Central Europe's industrial base and energy mix. This alignment could allow them to coordinate in Council working groups, where the Visegrad Four once voted as a bloc.

The Visegrad Group: revival or relic?

Magyar has repeatedly called for reviving the Visegrad Group (V4), Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, which was paralysed by the Orban-Tusk feud. In early May, Slovak prime minister Robert Fico posted a photograph with Czech prime minister Andrej Babis and Tusk captioned: 'Three Musketeers await the fourth and the revival of the V4.' The image was choreographed for domestic audiences in Bratislava and Prague, where both leaders face elections within eighteen months. But Martin Vokalek, director of the Brussels-based think tank Europeum, warned that 'it will take more than a selfie' to restore meaningful cooperation. 'Poland now sees itself more as a regional power and wants to move significantly closer to Germany and France,' he said.

The shift is measurable. Polish-German intergovernmental consultations, dormant since 2018, resumed in July 2024 and produced joint declarations on defence procurement, energy infrastructure and eastern neighbourhood policy. Warsaw's trade with Berlin reached €174 billion in 2025, nearly double its combined trade with the other three V4 members. Tusk's priority is the Weimar Triangle format with Paris and Berlin, not a grouping that includes a Hungarian partner still proving its reliability.

Asymmetric domestic strength

The bilateral dynamic is shaped by contrasting parliamentary arithmetic. Magyar's Tisza Party won 172 of 199 seats, a two-thirds supermajority that lets him amend the constitution, appoint judges and pass legislation without negotiation. Tusk governs through a three-party coalition (Civic Coalition, Third Way, The Left) that holds 248 of 460 Sejm seats. His Christian Democratic and conservative partners block his pledges to liberalise abortion law and introduce civil partnerships. On paper, Magyar is the stronger partner; in practice, Poland's larger economy (GDP €842 billion versus Hungary's €215 billion in 2025) and deeper EU institutional ties give Tusk leverage in Brussels.

Corruption promises: delivery versus delay

Both leaders rode anti-corruption platforms to power. Magyar's campaign centred on dismantling the 'System of National Cooperation', the network of Fidesz-linked oligarchs, foundations and public procurement channels that Transparency International Hungary estimates diverted €14, 18 billion annually. Tusk made similar pledges in 2023. Twenty-nine months later, his government has passed a whistleblower protection law and strengthened the prosecutor's office, but high-profile PiS figures remain uncharged. The Polish daily Gazeta Wyborcza warned: 'Magyar should learn from Poland's example that he must not let up. Delays in holding corrupt politicians accountable lead to frustration among voters.'

Magyar's first test came within weeks. In late April, his government published a list of 342 public contracts awarded without tender between 2018 and 2025, valued at €6.7 billion. The prosecutor's office opened preliminary investigations in twelve cases involving former ministers' relatives. The pace suggests Magyar intends to move faster than Warsaw, but the scale of the network, embedded in municipal governments, state-owned enterprises and EU-funded projects, means convictions will take years.