Kosovo heads to second election in ten months as gridlock persists

Kosovo will hold its second parliamentary election in ten months on 28 December, a rerun forced by a political class that proved unable to turn a plurality into a government. The February vote gave Albin Kurti's Vetevendosje 42 per cent of the vote and 58 seats, the largest bloc but three short of a majority in the 120-seat assembly. What followed was not negotiation but paralysis: more than half a year, over 50 rounds of voting and a constitutional court intervention before a speaker, Dimal Basha, could be elected in late August. Coalition talks then collapsed, and President Vjosa Osmani dissolved parliament on 20 November.

A parliament that never started

The February result was a rejection of single-party rule. Vetevendosje had governed with an absolute majority since 2021; voters trimmed it to a plurality. In most European systems that would trigger immediate coalition talks. In Pristina it triggered a procedural vacuum. The speaker's post, which controls the legislative agenda, became a prize neither the government nor the opposition could concede. Only after the constitutional court ruled that the assembly must elect a speaker did Basha, a figure acceptable to a slice of the centre-right, secure the necessary votes. By then the calendar had moved to late August.

Kurti then opened talks with opposition parties. None produced an agreement. The president, who under the constitution holds the mandate to propose a prime ministerial candidate and dissolve parliament if no government forms, mediated several rounds. On 20 November she announced that all avenues were exhausted and set the election date for 28 December. The assembly had sat for barely three months and passed no significant legislation.

The arithmetic that blocked a government

Vetevendosje's 58 seats left it dependent on at least three deputies from outside its ranks. The opposition landscape is fragmented: the centre-right Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK) and the Serb List, which holds the ten seats guaranteed to the Serbian minority. Kurti's sovereignty-first rhetoric, particularly his insistence on dismantling Belgrade-backed parallel structures in the north, made him toxic to the Serb List and difficult for the mainstream opposition to embrace without alienating their own voters. The opposition, meanwhile, refused to prop up a weakened Kurti without ministerial portfolios and policy concessions he would not grant.

Donika Emini, a political scientist who has tracked Kosovo's post-independence trajectory, put it bluntly: "It's important that the parties demonstrate political maturity by being prepared to form governing coalitions." She argued the stalemate "clearly showed that, to the political elite, the interests of the country and people are secondary." In recent weeks she has detected a shift: Vetevendosje signalling openness to broader cooperation. Whether that survives the campaign is the central question of the December vote.

A year of frozen decisions

The cost of the deadlock is measured in euros and lives deferred. Kosovo cannot access roughly €820 million in pre-allocated EU subsidies, funds earmarked for infrastructure, energy, rule-of-law reform and small-business support, because no parliament exists to ratify the financing agreements. A 2026 budget was never adopted. Justice reforms required by the EU's stabilisation and association process stalled. Economic legislation to address the informal sector and improve tax collection gathered dust.

The social backdrop is stark. Official unemployment exceeds 25 per cent; among young people it is higher still. Around 20 per cent of the population lives below the poverty line. There is no universal statutory health insurance. Schools lack qualified teachers and equipment. The result is a sustained exodus: young Kosovars leave for Germany, Switzerland, Austria and beyond. Remittances from the diaspora have accounted for 12 to 18 per cent of GDP over the past decade; in 2024 the figure was approximately 13 per cent, according to central bank data. That inflow props up consumption but cannot substitute for domestic investment or public services.

The Serbia question that never leaves

Every Kosovo government contends with Belgrade. The EU has pressed for a comprehensive normalisation agreement, but the conditions, particularly the creation of an association of Serb-majority municipalities with executive powers, are seen in Pristina as a vehicle for Serbian institutional capture. Kurti's answer has been "sovereignty politics": closing parallel Serbian licensing, customs and judicial structures in the north, often through police operations that Brussels considers provocative. The EU responded with sanctions, suspending high-level dialogue and freezing the very funds now partially released.

The partial thaw came after October's local elections in the north, where Serb List candidates won mayoralties in municipalities that had been run by Albanian officials since the 2023 boycott. The EU judged this a sufficient return to multi-ethnic representation to justify releasing some funds. It did not, however, resolve the underlying dispute. Any government emerging in January will face the same choice: negotiate a settlement that looks like capitulation to nationalists at home, or maintain confrontation that keeps Brussels at arm's length.

What voters in Pristina expect

At the Christmas market on Zahir Pajaziti Boulevard, the mood is resignation laced with anger. Liridon Spahiu, a 28-year-old student, said: "Over the past few months, we've all increasingly been asking ourselves: What on earth is going on with this country and with the politics here?" Nuhi Asllani, a 65-year-old pensioner, does not believe the December vote will change anything: "The gridlock is bound to continue." Nazmi Gashi, a 50-year-old businessman, offered a prescription: "The result is not the most important thing, what's important is that there should be an awareness of the need to come to an agreement." Spahiu added: "People don't want to see politicians' egos anymore; they want to see hard work, dedication to the country, and a better life for each and every one of us."

The EU's lever and its limits

Brussels remains the only external actor with leverage. The stabilisation and association agreement, in force since 2016, ties financial assistance to reform benchmarks. The European Commission's 2024 enlargement package noted Kosovo's "limited progress" on rule of law, public administration and the normalisation dialogue. The €820 million freeze was the sharpest tool the Commission has used. Its partial release signals a willingness to reward incremental steps, but the underlying conditionality has not changed. A new parliament will need to ratify the remaining financing agreements, pass a budget and restart the justice reform calendar before the next tranche flows.

The European Parliament's rapporteur for Kosovo has warned that repeated electoral cycles without government formation damage the country's credibility in the accession process. The Council has not yet discussed whether to open the first negotiating cluster, fundamentals, covering judiciary and fundamental rights, pending a functioning executive. That decision, originally expected in 2025, is now likely to slip into 2026 at the earliest.

December 28 and what follows

Polls suggest Vetevendosje will again emerge as the largest party, perhaps with a slightly reduced share. The opposition parties are campaigning separately, though some analysts detect quiet pre-electoral coordination among PDK, LDK and AAK. The Serb List is expected to take its ten guaranteed seats. If the arithmetic again yields no clear majority, the cycle repeats: speaker election, coalition talks, presidential mediation, possible dissolution. The constitution allows the president to dissolve parliament only once per year; if the December election produces another deadlock, the next dissolution could not occur before December 2026, a year of guaranteed stagnation.