Nordic and Baltic states forge eastern security axis as EU falters

A new security architecture is taking shape on NATO's eastern and northern flanks, driven not by Brussels but by the countries that border Russia or the Baltic Sea. On 13 May 2026, Bucharest hosted a summit that formally merged the Bucharest Nine, Poland, Romania, the three Baltic states, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Bulgaria, with the five Nordic members of NATO: Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy attended. The meeting followed a 5 March press conference in Warsaw where Polish President Karol Nawrocki and Romanian President Nicusor Dan proposed the integration, building on their annual Poland-Romania Solidarity Day celebrated two days earlier.

The logic of proximity

The convergence reflects a simple geographic reality: countries closest to the war in Ukraine perceive the threat differently from those further west. While Paris and Berlin debate strategic autonomy and weapons provenance, Warsaw, Riga, Tallinn, Vilnius, Bucharest and Stockholm have moved to practical cooperation. The Nordic-Baltic Eight (NB8) was already deepening before Finland and Sweden joined NATO; their accession turned a loose regional forum into the backbone of the alliance's northern flank. The Bucharest Nine (B9), launched in November 2015 after Russia's seizure of Crimea, provided the eastern equivalent. Merging them creates a contiguous arc from the High North to the Black Sea.

The source of urgency is threefold. Russian hybrid operations and conventional threats demand coordinated responses. The perceived retreat of American engagement under the Trump administration has eroded the transatlantic security guarantee that underpinned European defence for decades. And the European Union has proven unable to act decisively, frozen Russian assets remain largely untouched, sanctions packages are watered down by unanimity requirements, and the Franco-German Future Combat Air System (FCAS), launched in 2017 with a projected budget of 100 billion euros, is mired in industrial disputes between Dassault and Airbus.

Submarines, fighters and supply chains

Military-industrial cooperation is already producing contracts. Poland and Sweden concluded a deal for three A26 submarines, designed by Saab for the brackish waters of the Baltic Sea. Saab also signed a strategic collaboration agreement with the Polish state defence group PGZ, integrating the Polish firm into Saab's supply chain. These are not paper memoranda; they involve steel cutting and technology transfer.

The most consequential delivery is airborne. On 28 May at Uppsala airbase, Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson stood alongside Zelenskiy to announce that Ukraine may purchase 20 JAS Gripen E/F fighters for delivery before 2030, while Sweden will donate 16 older C/D-series aircraft currently in Swedish service. Sweden has already donated a Saab Erieye airborne early warning aircraft. The combination means Ukrainian pilots will have both the fighters and the radar picture to contest Russian air superiority, particularly the glide-bomb attacks that have devastated front-line positions. Discussions continue on a larger package of up to 150 aircraft, with possible final assembly in Canada or Ukraine.

Hungary's pivot unblocks the east

For years, Viktor Orban's Fidesz government used its veto to stall EU decisions on Russia sanctions, Ukraine aid and defence integration. That changed with the election of Peter Magyar's Tisza party. The new government in Budapest has curtailed Russian influence, revived Visegrad cooperation, and prompted Nordic capitals, long critical of Orban, to engage constructively with Hungary again. The shift removes a structural obstacle that paralysed the B9's southern tier and the Visegrad Four alike.

Poland buys Korean, Sweden builds Canadian

Poland's rearmament programme, the largest in Europe, has pointedly ignored French insistence that Ukrainian and European weapons be sourced within the EU. Warsaw has ordered K2 tanks, K9 howitzers and FA-50 light combat aircraft from South Korea, arguing that delivery schedules and industrial partnership terms are superior. Meanwhile, Sweden has exploited the diplomatic rift between Washington and Ottawa to deepen defence ties with Canada. Agreements cover the Saab Erieye airborne early warning system and exploration of joint JAS Gripen production in Canada. At the European Political Community meeting in Yerevan, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney described his country as the "most European of non-European countries," a line echoed by Zelenskiy.

Ukraine as mentor, not supplicant

The Lublin Triangle, Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine, established in July 2020 and marking its fifth anniversary in July 2025, anticipated this shift. Its founding declaration by foreign ministers Linas Linkevicius, Jacek Czaputowicz and Dmytro Kuleba emphasised military, cultural, economic and political integration alongside support for Ukraine's NATO path. The format now looks less like assistance and more like partnership. Ukrainian battlefield experience with drones, electronic warfare and asymmetric tactics is feeding directly into Nordic and Polish doctrine and procurement. As the source notes, European governments and contractors are realising that Ukraine is morphing from supplicant to mentor; those with the deepest bonds and strongest trust will have the industrial edge.

Nordic Compass: the economic flank

Security cooperation has an economic twin. The Nordic Compass initiative, chaired by former Finnish prime minister Jyrki Katainen, brings together Ericsson, Nokia, Saab, Nordea, Orsted and the Novo Nordisk Foundation in an industry-led alliance targeting capital markets, defence, deep tech and energy. The explicit aim is to move faster than EU-wide frameworks allow. Overregulation and centralised decision-making in Brussels have stifled innovation; regional alignment offers a bypass. The same logic that drives the B9-Nordic military merger, speed, proximity, shared threat perception, now applies to industrial competitiveness.

Franco-German paralysis and the Taurus question

The contrast with the Franco-German axis is stark. Chancellor Friedrich Merz has emerged as a vocal supporter of Ukraine, and Germany has delivered crucial air defence systems. Yet Berlin refuses to supply Taurus cruise missiles, which could strike the Kerch Bridge and undermine Russia's hold on Crimea. President Emmanuel Macron has championed European strategic autonomy but delivered only six Mirage 2000 fighters to Ukraine despite repeated pledges. The FCAS programme, intended to replace the Rafale and Eurofighter, remains stalled by workshare disputes between Dassault and Airbus. In this vacuum, the Nordic-Baltic-eastern coalition is becoming the de facto engine of European rearmament.

The risk, as always, is fragmentation. Countries that favour centralised EU defence funding and a diplomatic track with Moscow, notably France, Germany in its current posture, and southern members, may resist a two-speed security architecture. Moscow will exploit any fissure. But for the states on the front line, the calculation is settled: they cannot wait for consensus. They are building the alliance they need, with or without Brussels.