Europe buys US weapons for Ukraine to bypass Trump hesitation

European leaders have constructed a mechanism that lets the United States arm Ukraine without the American president having to confront Vladimir Putin directly. The arrangement, announced by Donald Trump on 15 July after a meeting with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte in the Oval Office, allows European countries to purchase US-made weapons for Kyiv while NATO coordinates the logistics. In practice, the Europeans are doing the buying, the Americans are taking the revenue, and Trump retains the political cover he needs with his isolationist base.

A German idea executed at speed

The initiative originated in Berlin. German officials describe it as a German idea, and Rutte confirmed that Germany is "massively" invested in the plan after visiting Chancellor Friedrich Merz in the capital only days before the announcement. Merz has spoken with Trump several times in recent days and assured him that Germany "will play a decisive role" in supplying Kyiv with American weapons. The chancellor portrayed the joint appearance with Rutte as evidence that Washington and its European allies are aligned on defending Ukraine.

Privately, German advisers acknowledge a more transactional reality. The approach "would enable the U.S. administration to increase the pressure on Russia and strengthen its support for Ukraine, while at the same time allowing it to remain one step behind the Europeans," a German government official who advises Merz said before the announcement. The same official noted that the arrangement preserves some of the "equidistance that may have characterized the first months of the Trump administration from an American perspective."

Why Trump said yes

Trump views global politics as a series of zero-sum financial transactions. European leaders understood that he would find it far easier to agree to arm Ukraine if the deal generated profit for US defence contractors and required no direct American military commitment. By purchasing the weapons themselves, the Europeans also give Trump cover against accusations from his MAGA base that he is dragging the United States into a foreign war. The president has grown visibly frustrated with Putin's refusal to negotiate a peace settlement, but he has stopped short of ordering a dramatic increase in direct military aid. The European workaround solves that dilemma for him.

The coalition and the holdout

Rutte listed four Nordic countries, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands as backers of the purchase plan. France was conspicuously absent. Two French officials confirmed that Paris will not join because President Emmanuel Macron remains committed to building a European defence industrial base rather than deepening reliance on American supply chains. The French government is simultaneously struggling to raise its own defence spending while cutting the budget deficit, a constraint that limits its ability to participate in any large-scale procurement programme.

Germany argues that European manufacturing capacity cannot meet Ukraine's immediate needs. With Russian bombardment intensifying this summer, Berlin has pushed particularly hard for a deal to acquire additional Patriot air defence systems. Zelenskyy confirmed the progress on X after Trump's announcement, writing that "the U.S., Germany, and Norway are already working together on this" and that other weapons would follow to protect Ukrainian cities and repel Russian assaults.

Patriots and the procurement gap

Details of specific purchases remain scarce, but the Patriot system has emerged as the centrepiece of the German effort. Ukraine has long sought more Patriots to counter Russian missile and drone campaigns that have devastated energy infrastructure and civilian areas. Germany already operates the system and has delivered at least two batteries to Kyiv since the full-scale invasion began. Norway, which also fields Patriots, is now part of the tripartite procurement discussion. The involvement of a non-EU NATO member underscores the alliance's role as the logistical backbone of the arrangement.

Merz's strategic reversal

The chancellor's embrace of this transactional diplomacy marks a striking departure from his rhetoric on election night in February. Merz then vowed "to strengthen Europe as quickly as possible so that, step by step, we can really achieve independence" from the United States. Five months later, he speaks of his faith in Trump's commitment to NATO and the indispensability of the transatlantic relationship. Advisers describe the shift as Realpolitik: Merz concluded that Trump is better managed through pragmatism than confrontation, especially when the alternative is a Ukrainian collapse that would threaten European security directly.

What happens next

The first test will be the speed of Patriot deliveries. Germany and Norway must finalise contracts with US manufacturers, secure export licences and arrange transport through NATO's logistics chain. Berlin has signalled it wants batteries in Ukraine before winter, when Russian strikes on energy infrastructure typically escalate. A second test is political: whether the coalition holds if Trump demands further concessions or if the US Congress blocks specific export licences. The French position will also be watched, if Paris cannot increase its own production quickly, pressure may grow for it to join the purchasing scheme despite Macron's objections. The next NATO defence ministers' meeting in October will offer the first formal review of whether the workaround is delivering weapons at the scale Kyiv needs.