Finnish President Stubb calls for European special envoy on Ukraine as coalition of willing meets in Paris

Finnish President Alexander Stubb has called for the appointment of a European special envoy to coordinate the continent's approach to Ukraine peace negotiations, arguing that the current leadership vacuum leaves international partners unsure who to contact. Speaking at the coalition of the willing meeting hosted by French President Emmanuel Macron in Paris on 28 March, Stubb said Europe needs both a negotiating team comparable to those fielded by the United States, Ukraine and Russia, and a single figure to oversee the effort.

The intervention comes as European leaders scramble to define a collective role in any future settlement to the war that began with Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022. While France and the United Kingdom have taken the lead on the coalition of the willing, a grouping Stubb described as originally a Franco-British initiative, the Finnish president warned that the absence of a designated European point of contact creates practical difficulties for allies and adversaries alike.

Two-phase approach to security guarantees

Stubb used the Paris meeting to clarify a distinction he believes is being widely misunderstood: the difference between forces deployed during a ceasefire and those that would operate under a final peace agreement. He set out two separate phases. The first phase, a ceasefire, remains a state of war. It would require reassurance measures, potentially including air, maritime and land capabilities, to deter violations while negotiations continue. Military staffs are currently planning for this contingency.

The second phase would begin only once peace has been "maintained, settled and agreed". At that point, crisis management or peacekeeping troops would deploy on the basis of an international mandate. Stubb was emphatic that these are "two quite separate things" and warned against conflating them. The distinction matters because the legal basis, rules of engagement and political authorisations differ fundamentally between a ceasefire monitoring mission and a peacekeeping operation established under a comprehensive settlement.

Scepticism on Russian ceasefire proposals

The Finnish president expressed deep scepticism about the ceasefire initiatives currently being discussed. He characterised the Russian approach as a classic negotiating tactic: Ukraine, Europe and the United States all want a full ceasefire, but Russia forces the discussion into partial ceasefires, first on energy infrastructure, which Russian forces bombed immediately after agreeing to it, and now on Black Sea shipping. These steps, Stubb acknowledged, move in the right direction, but he warned against underestimating Russia's capacity to break ceasefires. A full ceasefire, he argued, requires robust monitoring.

This assessment aligns with the pattern observed since the war's early months. The grain corridor agreement brokered by Turkey and the United Nations in July 2022 allowed Black Sea exports but did not stop Russian strikes on Ukrainian port infrastructure. Energy infrastructure ceasefires announced in 2024 were similarly violated. Western intelligence agencies have consistently assessed that Russia uses pauses to regroup and resupply rather than as genuine steps toward peace.

Response to US freeloading accusations

Stubb addressed recent criticism from US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth and Vice President JD Vance, who have accused European allies of freeloading on American security guarantees. While acknowledging the rhetoric is "a little bit tough", Stubb offered an unconventional defence of the Trump administration's pressure. He argued that President Trump has done more in five weeks to push Europe toward taking responsibility for its own security than previous American presidents achieved in 50 years. The practical effect, he said, is that Europe is now reacting, and that reaction is a positive development regardless of the tone.

The argument reflects a broader shift in European capitals. Since the Munich Security Conference in February 2025, where Vance delivered a blunt message about European defence burdens, several governments have accelerated procurement timelines and discussed new funding mechanisms. Germany's constitutional change to exempt defence spending from the debt brake, agreed in March 2025, is the most significant example. Finland, however, starts from a different baseline.

Finland's northern flank credentials

Stubb countered the freeloading charge directly with Finland's numbers. The country shares a 1,340km border with Russia, maintains obligatory military service, and fields one of Europe's largest militaries relative to its population of 5.6 million. Its artillery capability is the largest in Europe alongside Poland's. Finland has purchased 62 F-18 Hornets and is acquiring 64 F-35A Lightning II fighters from the United States, a procurement programme worth approximately €8.4 billion that represents one of the largest European orders for the aircraft.

Finland's NATO accession in April 2023, following Sweden's in March 2024, fundamentally altered the alliance's northern geometry. The two Nordic countries brought combined active and reserve forces of roughly 900,000 personnel, Arctic warfare expertise, and a strategic position that complicates Russian naval operations in the Baltic Sea and beyond. Finland's defence spending has consistently exceeded the NATO 2% of GDP guideline, reaching 2.3% in 2024, with a target of 2.5% by 2026. The country also hosts a growing US military presence under a Defence Cooperation Agreement signed in December 2023, granting access to 15 Finnish bases.

Coalition of the willing: Britain's return to European security

Stubb welcomed the coalition of the willing as a mechanism to "bring Britain back into Europe" and re-engage France and the United Kingdom constructively on defence. The phrasing is deliberate. Since Brexit, British participation in EU defence initiatives has been limited to ad hoc cooperation. The coalition format, outside EU structures but including key European NATO allies, allows London to play a leading role without treaty constraints. For Paris, it offers a vehicle to operationalise strategic autonomy concepts that have struggled to translate into concrete capabilities.

The coalition's composition remains fluid. The Paris meeting included representatives from roughly 30 countries, though the core contributors to any future mission are expected to be France, the United Kingdom, and a smaller group of willing partners including the Nordic and Baltic states. Germany has participated in discussions but remains cautious about explicit security guarantees that could be interpreted as Article 5 commitments outside NATO. Poland, despite its massive defence buildup, has emphasised that NATO remains the primary framework.

The negotiating gap

Stubb's call for a European special envoy highlights a structural problem. The United States has a special envoy for Ukraine and Russia in Keith Kellogg. Ukraine has its presidential office and diplomatic corps. Russia has its foreign ministry and presidential administration. The European Union has the High Representative for Foreign Affairs, Kaja Kallas, and the European Council President, António Costa, but neither holds a mandate to negotiate a war settlement on behalf of member states. The coalition of the willing has no single leader.

This fragmentation was evident in the Riyadh talks Stubb referenced, where US and Russian officials met without European representation. The subsequent meeting in Paris was partly a response to that exclusion. Yet without a designated envoy, European positions risk being communicated through multiple channels, bilateral, EU, NATO, diluting leverage. Stubb's proposal would concentrate authority in one figure, presumably backed by the major European capitals, though the selection process and mandate would require agreement among at least the quartet of France, Germany, the United Kingdom and Poland.

What happens next

The next coalition of the willing meeting is expected in London within the next six weeks, where military planning for phase one reassurance forces will advance. Simultaneously, EU foreign ministers will discuss the special envoy proposal at the Foreign Affairs Council in April. The critical variable remains the US position: if Washington pursues a bilateral deal with Moscow that sidelines Kyiv and European capitals, the coalition's relevance diminishes. If, however, the Trump administration insists on European ownership of security guarantees, the envoy role becomes essential. Finland, for its part, will continue its defence buildup, the next F-35 delivery is scheduled for late 2025, and its artillery modernisation programme, ensuring the northern flank remains a security provider rather than a consumer.