Rasmussen warns of forever war unless Europe escalates pressure on Russia

Anders Fogh Rasmussen, who ran NATO from 2009 to 2014 and served as Denmark's prime minister for eight years before that, has issued one of the most detailed and confrontational prescriptions yet for breaking the deadlock in Ukraine. In an interview with the Guardian, the former secretary general argued that Europe is sleepwalking into a "forever war" unless it dramatically escalates pressure on Moscow, including by stationing air defence systems on NATO territory to shoot down Russian missiles and drones targeting Ukrainian infrastructure.

An air shield on alliance territory

Rasmussen's central proposal is that NATO countries bordering Ukraine, principally Poland and Romania, should host missile and drone defence systems operated by the alliance. The logic is straightforward: an attack on those systems would constitute an attack on NATO territory, triggering Article 5. "We have to help the Ukrainian [people] protect themselves against Russian missiles and drones by building an air shield helping the Ukrainians shoot down Russian missiles and drones," he said. "NATO countries neighbouring Ukraine can be the location for a NATO-based air defence and missile system."

The idea is not new. Polish and Romanian officials have discussed similar concepts privately for months, but NATO has resisted any deployment that could be construed as direct participation in the conflict. Rasmussen's intervention matters because he speaks with the authority of someone who led the alliance through the 2014 Crimea annexation and the early phases of the Donbas war. He knows exactly where the red lines are drawn in Brussels and Washington, and he is arguing they must be redrawn.

A European protection force before a ceasefire

Equally striking is Rasmussen's call for a European protection force to be deployed inside Ukraine before any ceasefire agreement is signed. He dismissed the current "coalition of the willing", the loose grouping of European states discussing post-war security guarantees, as a "coalition of the waiting." The distinction is deliberate. Most European capitals, including Paris and London, have insisted that any troop deployment would follow a peace deal, not precede it. Rasmussen argues that sequencing is backwards: without a credible deterrent on the ground, Putin has no reason to negotiate seriously.

The proposal echoes suggestions made by French President Emmanuel Macron in early 2024, which were quickly walked back after German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and other leaders warned of escalation risks. Rasmussen acknowledges the political difficulty but insists the alternative is worse. "Changes in speed and mindset are needed," he said. The former NATO chief has been touring European capitals, including London, where he met Jonathan Powell, the UK national security adviser, to discuss whether the United States could offer security guarantees to Ukraine modelled on the commitment Washington gave Qatar after Israeli strikes on Doha.

The Taurus lever

Rasmussen's most concrete demand concerns German weapons policy. He urged Berlin to become the "first mover" by supplying Ukraine with Taurus cruise missiles, which have a range exceeding 500 kilometres and could strike targets deep inside Russia. That, he argued, would send a "clear signal across the Atlantic and put pressure on the White House" to approve the transfer of US-made Tomahawk missiles, which have similar range but greater inventory depth.

Germany has repeatedly refused Taurus deliveries, with Scholz citing the risk of escalation and the need for German personnel to assist with targeting, a red line for Berlin. Rasmussen dismissed those objections. "It is a strong German interest to force Putin to engage in peace negotiations … Taurus is the means to do so," he said. The calculation is that German action would break the taboo on long-range strikes inside Russia, making it politically easier for a reluctant US administration to follow suit.

Trump's shifting calculus

The context for Rasmussen's urgency is the unpredictability of US policy. Donald Trump, having initially signalled openness to supplying Tomahawks, appeared to step back, announced a second summit with Putin, then cancelled it after concluding the Russian leader was not serious about peace. The White House subsequently imposed sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil, Russia's two largest oil companies, but the overall posture, in Rasmussen's view, has reverted to letting the two sides "fight it out."

That vacuum is what the former NATO chief wants Europe to fill. His argument is not that Europe can replace American military power, it cannot, but that European initiative can shape American calculations. If Germany supplies Taurus, if Poland hosts NATO air defences, if a European force deploys to Ukraine, Washington faces a choice: lead the coalition or watch it act without US direction. History suggests the former is more likely.

The €150 billion question

Rasmussen's financial proposal is equally ambitious. He wants the €150 billion in Russian central bank assets frozen in Euroclear, the Brussels-based securities depository, to be used as collateral for a loan to Ukraine. The loan would fund weapons purchases and early reconstruction. The assumption is that neither Ukraine nor the EU would repay the principal; instead, repayment would come from Russian war reparations negotiated as part of a future settlement.

The plan ran into a wall at the last EU Council of Ministers meeting. Belgium, where Euroclear is headquartered, objected that there is no guarantee reparations will ever be paid, and insisted that all 27 EU member states would need to guarantee the loan's repayment. That demand effectively kills the proposal, since several member states, Hungary and Slovakia among them, would almost certainly refuse. Rasmussen predicted European leaders would overcome Belgium's objections, but he did not explain how.

Why the Qatar model matters

The discussion with Powell in London centred on a specific precedent: the security guarantee the United States extended to Qatar in 2024 after Israeli strikes on Doha. That guarantee was not a formal treaty obligation under Article 5, but a bilateral commitment backed by US military presence and explicit deterrence language. Rasmussen believes a similar framework could give Zelenskyy the political cover to accept a ceasefire that leaves Russian-occupied territory under Moscow's control, at least temporarily.

The Ukrainian president has repeatedly ruled out recognising Russian sovereignty over Crimea, Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia. But he has also acknowledged that military recovery of all territory is not currently feasible. A US security guarantee, even if shorter of NATO membership, could bridge that gap. The problem is that the Biden administration resisted such commitments, and the Trump administration has shown no interest in extending them.

The credibility gap

Rasmussen's critique contains an implicit indictment of European leadership since February 2022. The EU has imposed 14 sanctions packages, provided €120 billion in financial, humanitarian and military aid, and granted Ukraine candidate status. But on the three measures he considers decisive, long-range strike capability, forward air defence, and pre-ceasefire troop deployment, Europe has moved only in rhetoric. The "coalition of the willing" has produced joint statements, not battalions.

The former NATO chief's frustration is shared by military planners in several European capitals. They see a Russian economy on a war footing, producing artillery shells and drones at scale, while European defence industrial bases struggle to meet even the reduced targets set at the 2024 NATO summit in Washington. The gap between declared ambitions and delivered capabilities widens each month.

Rasmussen's tour of European capitals continues next week with stops in Paris, Warsaw and Kyiv. He will not be received as a head of state, but his meetings are with the officials who draft the options papers that ministers eventually approve or reject. Whether any of his five proposals survives that process is the measure of whether Europe has, in his words, woken up to the threat, or whether the "forever war" becomes the default planning assumption for the next decade.