Trump says he is considering US exit from NATO as European allies weigh the consequences

Donald Trump has moved from hinting at a US departure from NATO to stating it outright. In an interview with The Telegraph published on 1 April, the US president said he was "considering leaving Nato" and described the alliance as a "paper tiger" that Russian president Vladimir Putin also recognises as weak. The remarks are the most explicit yet from a sitting American president about abandoning the transatlantic security architecture that has underpinned European defence since 1949.

The trigger and the timeline

Trump's comments came days after Italy, France and Spain refused to grant the United States use of their bases or airspace for what the source describes as a "war of aggression against Iran". That refusal appears to have sharpened the president's long-standing hostility toward the alliance. On Monday and Tuesday, US secretary of state Marco Rubio and defence secretary Pete Hegseth made similar NATO-sceptical statements, suggesting a coordinated messaging effort. Trump told Reuters he would repeat the threat in a televised speech later on Wednesday.

Whether this constitutes official US policy remains unclear. A formal withdrawal requires an act of Congress and a notification to NATO under Article 13 of the North Atlantic Treaty, after which membership ends one year later. Trump has a history of floating contradictory foreign policy ideas in private calls with journalists, the Financial Times' Edward Luce has been on the receiving end, that subsequently lead to no action. But the convergence of presidential, state department and pentagon rhetoric in the space of three days marks an escalation.

European capitals respond with calibrated dismissal

Neither NATO nor the European Commission issued a formal response on Wednesday. The British prime minister, Keir Starmer, characterised the remarks as "pressure" and "noise", adding: "Whatever the pressure on me and others, whatever the noise, I'm going to act in the British national interest … this is not our war, and we're not going to get dragged into it." He was referring to the Iranian scenario. Yet Starmer also said the UK would seek closer defence ties with the EU at a summit later this year, acknowledging that "when it comes to defence and security and our economic future, we have to have closer ties with Europe."

In Paris, the French junior defence minister, Alice Rufo, was more direct. "Let me remind you what Nato is," she told a conference. "It is a military alliance concerned with the security of the Euro-Atlantic region. It is not designed to carry out operations in the Strait of Hormuz, which would be a breach of international law." Her framing, that the alliance's geographic mandate does not extend to the Middle East, mirrors the legal position Paris has maintained since the 1950s, when France first limited its integrated military participation.

The deterrent that may already be gone

Behind the public composure, European diplomats describe a more alarming reality. One EU diplomat, speaking on condition of anonymity, said Trump's escalating rhetoric meant NATO's Article 5 collective defence guarantee against Russia was "de facto no longer active" regardless of whether the United States formally exits or merely withdraws from the command structures, as France did in 1966 and Greece in 1974. "The French and the British know this and are preparing for war with Russia," the diplomat said. "The Polish government too."

The same source estimated that Moscow might attack within the year. "I personally think it will be this year, in which case we're not ready … Ukraine gave us four years to prepare and we wasted them." Even if Putin holds back, the diplomat argued, the Russian president can leverage the fear Trump generates to extract concessions from European governments. "Putin loves fear. He plays with it … You can rule and negotiate with fear, especially fear among the elites."

Ukraine funding stranded by a single veto

The security vacuum coincides with a financial one. The European Union had assembled a €90 billion loan package for Kyiv, but Hungary's prime minister, Viktor Orbán, has vetoed it. Orbán, widely seen as the EU leader closest to the Kremlin, has blocked the disbursement despite the European Council's attempts to work around national vetoes through alternative funding mechanisms. The result is that Ukraine's immediate financing now depends on bilateral contributions from willing member states rather than a collective EU instrument.

A Ukrainian diplomat described the moment as "approaching another security abyss in Europe, outside of any architecture" should the United States actually leave NATO. But he added that "even bullshit said by the US president influences the fragile security environment." The comment captures a dynamic European officials have wrestled with since 2016: the strategic impact of presidential rhetoric does not wait for legal processes.

What Article 13 actually requires

The NATO treaty's withdrawal clause is brief. Article 13 states that any party may cease to be a member one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the government of the United States, which acts as depositary. The notice must be communicated to all other parties. In US domestic law, the question of whether a president can unilaterally withdraw from a Senate-ratified treaty without congressional approval is unsettled. Legal scholars are divided; the Supreme Court has never ruled definitively. What is certain is that the one-year clock does not start until formal notification is deposited, and that step has not been taken.

European rearmament: rhetoric versus reality

Since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, European NATO members have increased defence spending. Poland now allocates more than 4 per cent of GDP to defence, the highest in the alliance. Germany passed a €100 billion special fund and committed to meeting the 2 per cent target permanently. France has accelerated its nuclear modernisation programme. But procurement cycles are measured in years, and critical gaps remain in air defence, long-range strike, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities that the United States currently provides.

The EU diplomat's assessment that Europe "wasted" the four years bought by Ukrainian resistance reflects a widespread frustration in Brussels and national capitals. The European Defence Industrial Strategy, the European Defence Fund, and the Strategic Compass all exist on paper. Their translation into interoperable, deployable force structure has been slower than the deterioration of the security environment.

The Iranian dimension and the Article 5 trap

The immediate catalyst, the refusal of three southern European NATO members to support US military action against Iran, reveals a structural tension. Article 5 commits allies to collective defence in the Euro-Atlantic area. It does not obligate them to join offensive operations outside that zone. Washington has periodically pressed allies to extend the alliance's reach; Paris, Rome and Madrid have consistently resisted. Trump's reaction suggests he views that resistance not as a legitimate interpretation of the treaty but as a betrayal warranting alliance dissolution.