Czech coalition plan to scrap licence fees puts public media independence at risk

The populist ANO movement of billionaire Andrej Babiš finished first in Czechia's parliamentary election on 4 October and is now negotiating a three-way coalition with the far-right Freedom and Direct Democracy party (SPD) and the radical-right Motorists for Themselves. Together the three groups hold a parliamentary majority, but the policy agenda they presented to President Petr Pavel this week has alarmed media freedom advocates, former dissidents and European observers. The most consequential proposal concerns the future of Czech Television (ČT) and Czech Radio (ČRo), the country's highly regarded public broadcasters.

The coalition taking shape

ANO won 27.1% of the vote in October, capitalising on voter fatigue after four years of austerity under outgoing Prime Minister Petr Fiala's centre-right government. Babiš campaigned on higher social spending and lower taxes, a platform that also drew support away from more extremist parties. Yet the coalition he is building relies on two parties that sit firmly on the nationalist, Eurosceptic right. SPD, led by Tomio Okamura, has long advocated leaving the EU and NATO; Motorists for Themselves began as a single-issue protest movement against traffic regulations and has expanded into a broader anti-establishment force. The government programme they signed this week emphasises a "Czechia first" foreign policy, reduced support for Ukrainian refugees, and a halt to the outgoing government's ammunition supply initiative for Kyiv. It also prioritises the Visegrád Group (V4), Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and Czechia, as a diplomatic vehicle.

Babiš insists that EU and NATO membership are "unquestionable" for Czechia and points to his own business empire, the agrochemical conglomerate Agrofert, which operates across the single market, as a practical brake on any obstructionist turn in Brussels. During his first premiership (2017, 2021) he cultivated warm relations with Emmanuel Macron and other European leaders while keeping Eurosceptic rhetoric for domestic consumption. Analysts note, however, that the new coalition is likely to join Hungary and Slovakia in opposing EU migration and climate legislation, and that the smaller partners' demands could amplify Babiš's own authoritarian instincts.

Public media in the crosshairs

The coalition's most concrete institutional target is the funding model of Czech public broadcasting. Since the 1990s, ČT and ČRo have been financed primarily through a mandatory monthly licence fee, currently CZK 150 (€6.15) per household for television and CZK 55 for radio, collected separately from general taxation. The three parties argue that the broadcasters are biased against them and propose scrapping the fees entirely, replacing them with direct allocations from the state budget. Babiš has also floated merging the two organisations into a single entity, claiming it would generate large savings. Media professionals and independent analysts dispute the savings argument and say the real purpose is to create an opportunity to hand-pick new leadership.

Marina Urbaníková of Masaryk University in Brno has surveyed supporters of the three coalition parties and found they are significantly more likely to perceive public media as biased and to accept populist narratives that question its legitimacy. "It's clear that such moves bring considerable risks," Urbaníková said. "For instance, merging public service media was one of Viktor Orbán's first steps towards taking full control of Hungary's democratic institutions." An open letter signed by prominent figures from the 1989 Velvet Revolution dissident movement described the proposal as "a proposal to liquidate public media" and warned of "the destruction of one of the pillars of democracy."

The Hungarian and Slovak precedent

The trajectory in Czechia's two eastern neighbours offers a concrete warning. After returning to power in 2010, Orbán's Fidesz government restructured Hungary's public media, merging outlets and installing loyalists in leadership positions. Within years, the public broadcaster became a reliable amplifier of government messaging. Slovakia followed a similar path after Robert Fico's Smer-SD returned to office in late 2023. Legislation passed in 2024 dissolved the existing public broadcaster RTVS and replaced it with a new entity, STVR, whose governing bodies are politically appointed. Journalists at STVR have since reported direct editorial interference and pressure to align coverage with the government line.

"Slovak public media has moved closer to the government agenda," said Václav Štětka, a leading scholar of Central European media at Loughborough University. "The same was done in Hungary. The worry is that Babiš is seeking to copy the model." Štětka notes that the Czech plan mirrors the Hungarian and Slovak playbooks almost step for step: question the legitimacy of existing institutions, propose a merger or restructuring, replace independent funding with state money, and install politically loyal management. The difference, he argues, is that Czechia's democratic defences are thicker.

Institutional checks and balances

The first hurdle is President Petr Pavel, a former NATO general who must formally appoint the government and its ministers. Pavel has already signalled he could reject specific ministerial nominations if they threaten the independence of democratic institutions, explicitly naming public media as a red line. Unlike Hungary and Slovakia, Czechia also retains a functioning upper house, the Senate, which can delay or amend legislation passed by the lower house. The Senate's composition, elected in staggered cycles, makes it harder for a single election victory to capture the entire legislative machinery. Moreover, Czech public broadcasting has a 100-year history and a professional culture that survived both Nazi occupation and communist rule, giving it deeper institutional resilience than its counterparts in Budapest or Bratislava.

At the European level, the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA), which entered into force in August 2024, provides a new enforcement toolkit. The regulation obliges member states to safeguard the editorial independence of public service media, ensure transparent and stable funding, and protect journalists from political interference. The European Commission can launch infringement procedures, and the European Board for Media Services, a new body composed of national regulators, can issue opinions and mediate disputes. While the EMFA has not yet been tested in a high-profile case, its existence raises the cost of a Hungarian-style capture strategy.

The street as ultimate safeguard

History suggests that Czech civil society may be the most effective barrier. In 2000, a government attempt to seize control of Czech Television collapsed after massive street protests. In 2019, during Babiš's first premiership, roughly 250,000 people demonstrated in Prague, the largest protests since the Velvet Revolution, demanding his resignation over conflict-of-interest allegations and perceived threats to democratic norms. Babiš ultimately survived that term but the memory of those demonstrations lingers. Analysts believe he is unlikely to welcome a repeat performance so early in a new mandate. "It's unlikely he'll want to mark his return to power with a repeat performance," Štětka observed.

Public broadcasters across Central Europe have been a target for politicians of every stripe since 1989. Štětka argues that the region's political elites have never fully accepted the premise of an independent public service media, viewing it instead as a resource to be captured. What distinguishes Czechia is not the absence of pressure but the consistent ability of journalists, courts and citizens to push back. The coming months will test whether that resilience holds against a government that controls both the executive and a parliamentary majority, backed by two parties that have never hidden their hostility to liberal institutions.

What the European Media Freedom Act could mean

The EMFA is the first EU regulation to address media independence directly. It requires member states to guarantee the editorial independence of public service media in law, to provide funding that is "adequate, stable and predictable", and to ensure that appointments to governing bodies are transparent and merit-based. If the Czech coalition proceeds with abolishing the licence fee and merging ČT and ČRo without robust safeguards, the Commission could open an infringement procedure under Article 258 TFEU. The European Board for Media Services, which held its constitutive meeting in September 2025, can also issue opinions on draft legislation that affects media markets. While the EMFA does not give Brussels a veto over national media laws, it creates a legal framework for judicial review at the Court of Justice and political pressure in the Council. For a government that still values EU structural funds and single-market access, that pressure is not negligible.