Politics · Enlargement
EU warns Ukraine over stalled rule-of-law reforms as parliament blocks five measures
European Commission reiterates membership conditions after Kyiv's law enforcement committee rejects anti-corruption legislation needed to unlock €2.1 billion in aid
The European Commission has reminded Ukraine that its EU membership ambitions depend on tangible progress in judicial reform and anti-corruption work, days after the Verkhovna Rada's law enforcement committee rejected five bills that would have advanced both. The blockage, confirmed on 19 August, puts at risk a €2.1 billion tranche of financial support and calls into question the credibility of a reform timetable Kyiv agreed to only months ago.
What the parliament rejected
The five measures blocked by the committee would have expanded the investigative powers of Ukraine's anti-corruption agencies, restructured the Prosecutor General's Office and the State Investigation Bureau, and repealed legislation that has been used to obstruct corruption prosecutions. Together they represent a subset of the 10 priorities set out in the Kachka-Kos plan, named after former deputy prime minister for European integration Taras Kachka and European Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos. That plan, finalised in December 2025, was intended to accelerate a reform process that had stalled since Ukraine received candidate status in June 2022.
Since the plan's publication, not a single one of the 10 priorities has been enacted. The committee's decision last week therefore represents not a temporary delay but a continuation of a pattern in which parliamentary factions protect vested interests, particularly those linked to the prosecutor's office and the security services, from oversight. Opposition politicians described the vote as a coordinated effort to preserve impunity for high-level corruption.
The financial architecture behind the pressure
The European Commission's leverage derives from the Ukraine Plan, the operational framework for a €90 billion loan facility approved by the Council in April 2026. The facility is disbursed in tranches, each conditional on the fulfilment of specific reform milestones. The €2.1 billion now at stake is the next scheduled payment, earmarked for budget support and tied explicitly to the rule-of-law benchmarks in the Kachka-Kos plan. If the reforms are not passed by the end of 2026, the tranche will not be released.
This is not the first time Brussels has used financial conditionality to drive reform in Kyiv. The macro-financial assistance programmes of 2015-2020 operated on similar principles, though with smaller sums and less political integration at stake. The current facility is an order of magnitude larger and is explicitly linked to the accession process, making the conditionality both more powerful and more politically sensitive for Ukrainian leaders.
Commission response: measured but firm
Markus Lammert, the Commission's spokesperson, told the Kyiv Independent on 25 August that the executive was 'aware of the latest developments' and reiterated that 'rule of law and the fight against corruption is an essential element for any country to join the European Union.' He noted that Ukraine had committed to the reforms both in the context of the Ukraine Plan and the Kachka-Kos priorities. 'It is for the Ukrainian authorities to carry out this work in a consistent and efficient manner,' he added, a formulation that places the onus squarely on Kyiv while avoiding any explicit threat.
The tone is deliberate. The Commission cannot afford to be seen as dictating legislative outcomes to a sovereign parliament, especially one in a country at war. But it also cannot afford to disburse funds when the agreed conditions have not been met. The €90 billion facility was designed with this tension in mind: the milestones are public, the monitoring is transparent, and the decision to release or withhold funds rests on a technical assessment that is difficult to politicise.
Belgium adds diplomatic weight
The day before the committee vote, Belgian Foreign Minister Maxime Prevot addressed a press conference in Kyiv and framed the reforms in terms that resonated beyond Brussels. 'An independent judiciary, solid democratic institutions, bodies effectively able to fight corruption, these are not just reforms designed to please Brussels,' he said. 'These reforms are designed to protect citizens, reinforce trust, and make your country more resilient.' Belgium holds the rotating Council presidency until the end of June 2026, giving Prevot's words the weight of the member state currently chairing enlargement discussions.
Prevot's intervention reflects a broader shift among member states. In the early months of the war, many capitals were reluctant to press Kyiv on governance for fear of undermining wartime unity. As the conflict enters its third year, that restraint is fading. The argument, made privately in Council working groups and now publicly by Prevot, is that corruption weakens Ukraine's defence effort by diverting resources, eroding public trust, and providing Russia with narrative ammunition. The reforms are therefore a security imperative, not merely a bureaucratic one.
Domestic politics behind the blockade
The committee's composition explains much of the resistance. Its chair and several key members have ties to the Prosecutor General's Office and the State Investigation Bureau, the very institutions the reforms would restructure. The Prosecutor General, Andriy Kostin, has publicly opposed measures that would reduce his office's control over investigative priorities, arguing that wartime conditions require centralised command. The State Investigation Bureau, meanwhile, has resisted transferring complex corruption cases to the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU), which would gain jurisdiction under the blocked bills.
President Volodymyr Zelenskyy's office has been notably quiet since the 19 August vote. In previous standoffs, the presidential administration has intervened to whip votes or propose compromise language. This time, no public statement has been issued, and sources in the parliamentary majority suggest the leadership is calculating whether the political cost of forcing the reforms through outweighs the cost of losing the €2.1 billion. With the war dominating the domestic agenda, the calculation is not obvious: many voters prioritise military spending over judicial procedure, and the opposition has struggled to mobilise public pressure on this issue.
The technical path forward
Procedurally, the five bills are not dead. They can be reintroduced in the next parliamentary session, which begins in September, and fast-tracked if the leadership chooses. The committee's rejection is a recommendation, not a final vote; the plenary could still pass them. But the political signal has been sent: the ruling party is not willing to expend political capital on these reforms at this moment. The Commission's next formal assessment of Ukraine's reform progress is due in October, ahead of the Enlargement Package that will shape the Council's December conclusions on accession negotiations.
There is a precedent for last-minute movement. In 2023, Ukraine passed a package of judicial reforms days before a Commission deadline, after months of stalling. The difference this time is the scale: the Kachka-Kos plan requires 10 laws, not one or two, and the parliamentary calendar is crowded with defence legislation, budget revisions, and the inevitable political manoeuvring ahead of the 2027 presidential election. Every week of delay makes the December deadline harder to meet.
A test of the merit principle
The episode illustrates a structural tension in the EU's enlargement policy. The Union insists that accession is a merit-based process governed by objective criteria. But the criteria are negotiated, the monitoring is political, and the consequences of failure are asymmetric: Ukraine loses funds and momentum; the EU loses credibility and strategic leverage. The Commission's statement on 25 August was calibrated to preserve the principle without triggering a confrontation it might not win. Whether that calibration holds depends on whether Kyiv decides that the cost of reform is lower than the cost of delay. The September session will provide the first answer.
Sources
People mentioned
Markus Lammert
Organisations
European Commission · Ukrainian parliament (Verkhovna Rada) · European Union