Former Tory minister urges Burnham to trade nuclear umbrella for single market return

A former Conservative minister who crossed the floor to advise Labour has laid out a detailed proposal for the United Kingdom to re-enter the European single market through a new "European Confederation" that would trade defence commitments for economic access. Nick Boles, who served in David Cameron's government before resigning in 2019 over Brexit, argues that Prime Minister Andy Burnham could secure an electoral legacy to rival Tony Blair by pursuing the plan.

The Confederation proposal

Boles's concept of a European Confederation attempts to resolve the central tension that has defined UK-EU relations since 2016: how to regain the economic benefits of single market membership without accepting the free movement of people that drove the Leave vote. Under his framework, the UK would gain full access to the single market and a youth mobility scheme, but would not be required to join the eurozone or accept unrestricted freedom of movement.

The quid pro quo is substantial. The UK would commit to spending 3.5 per cent of gross domestic product on defence, well above the NATO two per cent guideline and significantly higher than current British expenditure. In addition, Britain would formally extend the protection of its nuclear deterrent across the European continent, a commitment that would bind UK security policy to European defence architecture in a way no previous government has countenanced.

Boles describes the geopolitical backdrop as "pretty scary" world events since 2016, a coded reference to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the uncertainty of American security guarantees under shifting US politics, and the consequent pressure on European nations to assume greater responsibility for their own defence. The proposal effectively argues that Britain's nuclear arsenal and military capacity are assets the EU needs, and that single market access is the price.

Electoral arithmetic

The political calculation is explicit. Boles believes a single market deal would deal a "devastating" blow to both the Conservative Party and Nigel Farage's Reform UK, securing Labour's victory at the next general election. His reasoning rests on polling that consistently shows public opinion has shifted since the referendum. YouGov research conducted in June 2026, marking ten years since the Brexit vote, found 59 per cent of voters support a closer UK-Europe relationship against just 20 per cent opposed. On the single market specifically, half of respondents favoured rejoining compared with 26 per cent against.

These numbers represent a profound change from the 2016 referendum result and the subsequent parliamentary battles. The polling suggests the electoral coalition that delivered Brexit has fractured, leaving the parties most associated with it vulnerable on an issue where Labour could claim the popular position. Boles told The Independent: "If [Mr Burnham] sorts out social care and takes us into the single market and [a new] European Confederation, that is a more substantial legacy than anyone in the last few years. It would certainly rival Blair's."

Defence spending and the nuclear question

The 3.5 per cent defence spending target is the most concrete demand in the proposal. UK defence expenditure has hovered around 2.3 per cent of GDP in recent years, and reaching 3.5 per cent would require an increase of roughly £15 billion annually at current economic output. That sum would need to be found from taxation, borrowing, or spending cuts elsewhere at a time when public services are under acute pressure.

The nuclear umbrella extension is more novel. Britain's nuclear deterrent, carried on Vanguard-class submarines and their future Dreadnought replacements, has always been declared as a NATO asset. Formally extending its protection to a European Confederation would represent a political commitment to European defence autonomy that successive governments have avoided, preferring to channel security guarantees through the Atlantic alliance. The move would align with French President Emmanuel Macron's long-standing advocacy for European strategic autonomy, though Paris has guarded its own independent deterrent jealously.

EU institutional constraints

Whether the European Union would accept such a construct is an open question. The single market's four freedoms, goods, services, capital, and people, are treated as indivisible in EU law. The European Commission has consistently rejected "cherry-picking" arrangements, most notably during the negotiation of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement that governs current UK-EU relations. A confederation that grants single market access without free movement would require either treaty change or a novel legal instrument that could survive challenge at the Court of Justice of the European Union.

Member states would also have divergent views. Eastern European capitals, particularly Warsaw and the Baltic states, might welcome a British nuclear guarantee and higher defence spending. Others, notably France and Germany, have historically resisted structures that dilute the EU's supranational character or create a two-tier Europe. The European Council would need unanimity to approve any new framework, giving each of the 27 members a veto.

Historical context and the Blair comparison

Boles's reference to Tony Blair is deliberate. Blair's legacy rests on three pillars: the Good Friday Agreement, the minimum wage and devolution, and the decision not to join the euro. His government's pro-European orientation was tempered by political caution; he promised a referendum on the euro that never happened, and his enthusiasm for the EU constitution foundered on French and Dutch referendums in 2005. A Burnham government that actually delivered single market re-entry would go further than Blair dared.

The comparison also highlights the different political landscapes. Blair commanded a 179-seat majority in 1997 and faced a Conservative Party divided over Europe. Burnham's parliamentary arithmetic is unknown from the source material, but any government attempting this would face a Reform UK party built explicitly on opposition to EU reintegration, a Conservative Party whose membership remains largely Eurosceptic, and a Labour left that may object to the defence spending commitment.

Public opinion and the youth mobility dimension

The inclusion of youth mobility in the proposal is politically astute. The loss of Erasmus+ and the end of frictionless work and study opportunities for young Britons has been one of the most tangible consequences of Brexit, and one that polls suggest resonates beyond traditional Remain voters. A scheme allowing people under 30 to live and work in EU member states for limited periods would address a specific grievance without triggering the broader immigration anxieties that free movement provokes.

The YouGov polling cited by Boles aligns with other surveys conducted since 2022 showing a steady drift toward favouring closer ties. The European statistical office has documented the economic divergence between UK and EU growth rates since 2020, providing an empirical backdrop to the political argument. Whether that translates into electoral reward depends on whether voters prioritise the single market over other issues, inflation, housing, the NHS, at the next election.

Obstacles in Westminster

Even if the EU were receptive, the domestic parliamentary battle would be fierce. The 3.5 per cent defence commitment implies either tax rises or spending cuts that would dominate the budget debate. The nuclear extension would require a strategic defence and security review, parliamentary scrutiny, and likely a vote. Labour's own backbenchers include both Atlanticists who would welcome deeper European defence integration and left-wingers who oppose increased military spending and nuclear commitments.

The Conservative Party, meanwhile, would face an existential dilemma. Opposing a deal that delivers single market access, which British business has lobbied for since 2016, while demanding higher defence spending, which Conservatives traditionally support, would expose the party's post-Brexit incoherence. Reform UK would attack any agreement as betrayal, but their electoral ceiling may be lower than in 2019 if the polling holds.

The European response

No EU leader has publicly responded to the Confederation idea. The European Commission's standard position remains that the single market's integrity requires acceptance of all four freedoms. However, the EU has shown flexibility when geopolitical imperatives demanded it: the rapid granting of candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova in 2022, the suspension of state aid rules during the pandemic, and the joint procurement of vaccines all demonstrated that rules can bend when strategic interests align. A British offer that strengthens European defence at a moment of American unpredictability might test that flexibility.

The European Council would be the forum for any political decision. Its president, and the leaders of France and Germany, would set the tone. If the proposal reaches that level, the negotiation would likely focus on governance: how a non-member state participates in single market rule-making, dispute resolution, and budget contributions. The European Economic Area model, used by Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein, provides a template, but those states accept free movement and contribute to EU cohesion funds without a vote on legislation.