Germany outlines €12 billion missile arsenal to strike deep into Russian territory

Germany is preparing to spend almost twelve billion euros on a new family of long-range missiles that would give the Bundeswehr the ability to strike command centres, airfields and logistics hubs hundreds or even thousands of kilometres behind an adversary's front lines. Internal defence ministry documents seen by this publication show the programme has moved from concept to detailed budget planning, with the first weapons slated to enter service as early as 2027 and the most advanced Anglo-German systems targeted for the middle of the next decade.

The scale of the ambition marks a decisive break with the posture Berlin maintained for three decades after the Cold War. For years German planners treated deep strike as a capability best left to allies, particularly the United States. The war in Ukraine, and the growing consensus in German military circles that Russia could be ready to test NATO's eastern flank before 2030, have forced a rethink. The ministry's own talking points describe the effort as a top priority for both Germany and the alliance, aimed at maintaining conventional response options below the nuclear threshold.

Four pillars, one strategic logic

The documents break the buildup into four distinct strands, each solving a different timeline and tactical problem. The fastest track is a low-cost cruise missile designed for mass production and saturation attacks. Berlin wants the first examples qualified next year and a framework contract in place for large-scale procurement shortly after. Three candidates are in the running: the Anthem missile from US-Israeli startup Covenant Industries, the BARS system from an unnamed Ukrainian company, and the Flamingo from Ukrainian firm Fire Point. The ministry says it is in contract talks with two of the three suppliers.

The second pillar bridges the gap until European weapons mature. Chancellor Friedrich Merz told the Bundestag in early July that Germany had reached an agreement with Washington during the NATO summit in Ankara to acquire American Tomahawk cruise missiles and deploy them on US-supplied Typhon launchers. The internal target is an initial operational capability by the end of the decade. That gives Berlin a proven, 1,600-kilometre-range weapon almost immediately, albeit one that remains dependent on US production lines and export licences.

The remaining two pillars are jointly developed with the United Kingdom under the Trinity House Agreement signed last year. One is a high-end subsonic cruise missile; the other a hypersonic glide vehicle. Both are designed to exceed 2,000 kilometres of range. The ministry's cost breakdown assigns nearly nine billion euros to development and procurement of these Anglo-German systems, plus 182 million euros for sustainment. A further 1.8 billion euros covers the cruise missile strand, with 97 million for maintenance. Those figures sum to roughly eleven billion; separate talking points round the total to almost twelve billion.

The Ukrainian connection and the lesson of mass

The low-cost missile strand is the most revealing about how Berlin's thinking has shifted. Ministry documents describe the requirement as a cost-efficient, mass-producible weapon that can be used alongside far more expensive systems. That language echoes a lesson German officers have drawn from watching Ukraine's campaign against Russian refineries, airfields and command posts: cheap drones and missiles, launched in sufficient numbers, can overwhelm even sophisticated air defences and impose unsustainable costs on the defender.

In June the ministry told this publication that hitting high-value targets far behind enemy lines had become indispensable for credible deterrence. Cost-effective systems, it said, can overwhelm enemy air defences through mass attacks and are therefore of high operational value. The fact that two of the three shortlisted candidates come from Ukrainian-linked companies, one of them Fire Point, the other unnamed, suggests Berlin is willing to bypass traditional European defence primes in favour of firms that have already proven they can iterate quickly under combat conditions.

Tomahawks as a strategic bridge

The Tomahawk purchase is a pragmatic concession to urgency. The missile has been in US service since the 1980s, has been used in every major American conflict since the Gulf War, and the Block V variant now in production carries a 1,600-kilometre range and a modernised guidance suite. By mounting it on the Typhon ground launcher, itself a derivative of the Mk 41 vertical launch system, Germany gains a land-based deep-strike capability without waiting for a European development cycle that typically stretches a decade or more.

Merz framed the deal explicitly as closing a strategic gap. The phrase is deliberate. For years NATO's European members have relied on air-delivered cruise missiles such as Storm Shadow and Taurus, which require fighter aircraft to penetrate defended airspace. A ground-launched missile that can be fired from behind the front line changes the calculus for an adversary: it removes the need for air superiority before striking deep targets, and it complicates Russian planning for any conflict in the Baltic or Polish corridor.

The Anglo-German bet on sovereignty

If the Tomahawk is a bridge, the Trinity House projects are the destination. The UK and Germany have committed to developing a sovereign European deep-strike capability that does not depend on US supply chains or political consent. The hypersonic glide vehicle in particular represents a technological leap: a weapon that manoeuvres at speeds above Mach 5 in the upper atmosphere, making interception by current ballistic missile defences extremely difficult. Both governments have said publicly that the new systems must reach targets beyond 2,000 kilometres, putting Moscow and key Russian strategic sites within range from German territory.

The cost concentration here is striking. Nearly three-quarters of the entire programme budget is allocated to these two Anglo-German projects. That reflects the expense of developing hypersonic propulsion, high-temperature materials and autonomous guidance from scratch, something neither country has done alone before. The Trinity House Agreement, signed in London in October 2024, was designed precisely to pool those costs and avoid the duplication that plagued earlier European missile programmes such as the Franco-British Future Cruise/Anti-Ship Weapon.

The Bundestag hurdle

None of this money has been appropriated. The ministry's documents make clear that the figures are estimates submitted as part of the government's regular budget planning process. A spokesperson declined to comment on the total or on individual programmes, stating only that the measures are subject to the approval of the German Bundestag and that the ministry can comment only after parliament considers them. That phrasing is standard, but it underscores a political reality: the coalition must secure a majority for a multi-year commitment that will run well beyond the current legislative term.

The timing is delicate. Germany's constitutional debt brake limits new borrowing, and the defence budget is already stretched by the 100 billion euro special fund created in 2022, which expires in 2027. The missile programme will have to compete with pressing demands for ammunition stocks, artillery barrels, air defence systems and the recapitalisation of the armoured fleet. Defence Minister Boris Pistorius has argued publicly that deterrence requires both readiness and modernisation, but the parliamentary arithmetic is not guaranteed, especially if the economy continues to stagnate.

Industrial implications and the European base

The programme's structure reveals a deliberate hedging strategy. By buying cheap missiles from Ukrainian-linked firms, Tomahawks from the US, and co-developing high-end systems with the UK, Berlin avoids putting all its eggs in a single European prime contractor. That is a pointed contrast with the Franco-German MGCS tank programme or the FCAS fighter project, where industrial workshare negotiations have stalled progress for years. The ministry's willingness to sign framework contracts for mass production before the first qualification rounds are complete also signals a shift from the traditional German model of exhaustive testing followed by small-batch procurement.

For the UK, the Trinity House projects are a lifeline. British defence industry has struggled to sustain sovereign missile design capability since the end of the Cold War; the partnership with Germany guarantees a development budget and a launch customer. For Germany, it buys access to British expertise in ramjet propulsion and hypersonic aerodynamics, areas where German firms have limited recent experience. The arrangement is transactional, but it may prove more durable than the grander EU-level programmes that have foundered on competing national industrial policies.

A deterrence posture measured in kilometres

German military leaders have warned in classified briefings that Russia could reconstitute enough combat power to attack NATO territory by the end of the decade. The missile programme is the service's answer to that timeline. If deterrence fails, the logic runs, Russian military infrastructure must not be safe simply because of its distance from the front. A 2,000-kilometre range from German soil covers the western military district, the Black Sea fleet headquarters in Rostov-on-Don, and the strategic bomber bases at Engels and Olenya. It also holds at risk the rail and road junctions that would sustain a Russian offensive into the Baltics or Poland.