Vannacci's far-right party threatens Meloni's coalition from the right

A former general who once served as Italy's military attaché in Moscow has built a political force capable of fracturing the country's governing right in little more than six months. Roberto Vannacci's Futuro Nazionale, launched in February 2026 after his departure from Matteo Salvini's League, now claims 140,000 members and eight deputies in the Chamber of Deputies, defectors from both the League and Antonio Tajani's Forza Italia. Polls consistently place the new party at around 7 percent, a figure that would deny Giorgia Meloni's coalition a parliamentary majority if an election were held today.

From military attaché to party leader

Vannacci, 57, entered politics through the publication of his 2023 book "Il mondo al contrario" (The World Upside Down), which attacked LGBTQ+ individuals, migrants and minorities. The controversy propelled him onto the League's list for the June 2024 European Parliament elections, where he secured more than 530,000 preference votes. Salvini rewarded him with the deputy secretary role in May 2025, but Vannacci used the position to install loyalists on municipal election lists across Italy, building a personal network of local councillors and regional administrators. By autumn 2025, rumours circulated that the general was pursuing an agenda distinct from Salvini's. He left the League in February 2026 to form Futuro Nazionale, taking his network with him.

The trajectory mirrors a pattern seen elsewhere in Europe: a charismatic figure with military credentials exploiting dissatisfaction with mainstream right-wing parties deemed insufficiently radical. Vannacci's two years as military attaché in Moscow, ending in 2022, inform a worldview that combines hostility to NATO, opposition to Western sanctions on Russia, and open sympathy for Vladimir Putin. These positions resonate with a segment of the Italian electorate that has never fully accepted the country's Atlanticist orientation.

A platform built on exclusion and confrontation

Futuro Nazionale's programme reads like a compendium of contemporary far-right obsessions. The party advocates "remigration", the forced return of foreigners deemed insufficiently integrated, echoing the Alternative for Germany's terminology. It opposes the European Green Deal, rejects LGBTI rights and feminism, seeks to restrict abortion access, and proposes separate classes for intellectually disabled students. In July, an AI-generated video posted on Vannacci's social media channels depicted the leader in imperial Roman garb, seated between Meloni and Senate President Ignazio La Russa, sending political opponents, including Democratic Party leader Elly Schlein, Conte, former Chamber President Laura Boldrini and former European Commission President Romano Prodi, to their deaths via a thumbs-down gesture. The executioner in the video is Giuseppe Barboni, an FN militant who in July assaulted an Iraqi immigrant with a hammer and sickle in San Benedetto del Tronto.

The video, inspired by similar productions from Donald Trump's orbit, signals a campaign style that blends classical imagery with modern digital aggression. It also reveals the party's view of democratic politics: opponents are not rivals to be debated but enemies to be eliminated. The Global Project Against Hate and Extremism (GPAHE) had already classified both Brothers of Italy and the League as far-right hate groups in a July 2023 report, describing Meloni's party as "White Nationalist, Anti-Immigrant, Anti-LGBTQ+, Anti-Muslim" and the League as "Anti-Woman, Anti-Immigrant, Anti-LGBTQ+, Anti-Roma and Anti-Muslim." Vannacci's formation makes those tendencies explicit rather than implicit.

Polling arithmetic that threatens the government

Current polling gives Brothers of Italy 27 percent, the League 6 percent, Forza Italia 8 percent and Noi Moderati 1.1 percent. Futuro Nazionale's 7 percent would come almost entirely from this bloc. The Five Star Movement, meanwhile, sits at 12.7 percent under Conte's leadership, down from its 2018 peak but still a reservoir of anti-establishment sentiment. Vannacci explicitly targets disillusioned M5S voters who oppose military aid to Ukraine and feel betrayed by Conte's shift toward centrist positions. A letter from Luca Sforzini, president of the Vannacci-linked think tank Rinascimento Nazionale, to M5S founder Beppe Grillo in August proposed "common ground for dialogue" between the early anti-system M5S and the new party. Grillo has distanced himself from Conte but retains symbolic authority among the movement's original base.

The arithmetic is unforgiving for Meloni. Her coalition's combined polling hovers around 42 percent, roughly the share she won in the 2022 general election that delivered a parliamentary majority under Italy's electoral law. A 7 percent bleed to a party that refuses alliances would likely translate into seat losses under the current system, which rewards pre-election coalitions. Meloni became the longest-serving prime minister in the Italian Republic's 80-year history precisely because the 2022 law gave her alliance a winner's bonus. That bonus disappears if the right fragments.

Meloni's dilemma: confront or accommodate

Meloni's initial response to Vannacci's launch was muted. In July, she accused Vannacci-aligned lawmakers of undermining the government and backing left-wing positions, a charge that seemed designed to frame the defectors as unreliable rather than ideological competitors. Her party and its allies have ruled out electoral agreements with Futuro Nazionale. Salvini was sharper, calling the split a "betrayal" and downplaying the new party's significance. Both leaders face the same trap: attacking Vannacci too aggressively validates his claim to represent the "real right" suppressed by a compromised establishment; ignoring him allows his polling to consolidate.

The prime minister has spent two years cultivating an image as a pragmatic conservative acceptable to European partners and financial markets. She has maintained Italy's support for Ukraine, worked within EU fiscal rules, and avoided the confrontational rhetoric that characterised her opposition years. A shift toward harder-line positions to outflank Vannacci would jeopardise that credibility. Yet failing to stem the bleed could leave her unable to form a government after the next election, due in roughly 18 months.

The Russian connection and hybrid threats

Vannacci's admiration for Putin and Trump places him at the intersection of two foreign influence networks. His opposition to NATO, support for lifting sanctions on Russia, and echoing of Kremlin talking points on Ukraine align with documented Russian efforts to amplify anti-establishment voices in Western democracies. The source text notes that "Italy will be a target of disinformation efforts, hybrid attacks and political interference" if Vannacci's support grows. This is not speculative: Italian intelligence services have repeatedly warned of Russian information operations targeting the country's political debate, particularly around energy policy and the war in Ukraine.

The Trump dimension adds complexity. Meloni has managed her relationship with the US president carefully, balancing alliance loyalty with European coordination. Vannacci's uncritical Trumpism creates a rival claimant to the transatlantic populist mantle. Should Trump return to the White House, or even as a private figure, his endorsement preferences could influence the Italian right's internal balance. The conflict between Trump and Meloni noted in the source suggests the US president may view Vannacci as a more natural ally.

The Five Star Movement's vulnerable flank

Conte's Five Star Movement faces a parallel threat. The M5S was founded in 2013 as an anti-system force channelling rage against the political class. Under Conte, it has become a more conventional centre-left partner, supporting the Draghi government in 2021-22 and moderating its euroscepticism. That evolution left a vacuum on the anti-establishment right that Vannacci is now filling. The Sforzini letter to Grillo is a calculated appeal to the movement's origins: a pitch to voters who wanted rebellion, not governance. Grillo's response, or silence, will indicate whether the M5S founder sees tactical value in destabilising his own successor.

The overlap is striking: both Vannacci and Conte oppose military aid to Ukraine, both express ambiguity about NATO, both channel anti-elite resentment. But Vannacci adds a cultural conservatism, anti-LGBTI, anti-feminist, pro-traditional family, that the M5S never embraced. This combination allows him to fish in two ponds simultaneously: the hard right alienated by Meloni's moderation, and the anti-system left alienated by Conte's institutionalisation.

What the numbers conceal

Polling 18 months before an election is an unreliable guide. Italian voters have a history of shifting allegiances rapidly, the M5S itself went from zero to 32 percent in four years. Vannacci's 7 percent may be a ceiling rather than a floor: his rhetoric is so extreme that it may repel voters who currently tell pollsters they support him as a protest. Conversely, the eight deputies who have already defected suggest a parliamentary infrastructure that can amplify his message beyond social media. The party's claimed 140,000 members, if verified, would exceed the League's current membership and approach Brothers of Italy's, providing organisational capacity for a national campaign.

A critical variable is the electoral law. The current Rosatellum system, a mixed member proportional representation model, rewards pre-election coalitions. If Futuro Nazionale runs alone, it wastes votes below the 3 percent threshold for proportional seats and the coalition threshold for the winner's bonus. But if it crosses 3 percent nationally, which current polls suggest it will, it enters parliament as a potential kingmaker. Meloni and Salvini have ruled out deals, but post-election arithmetic has a way of overriding pre-election vows.