CDU lawmaker Volkmann warns AfD gains would endanger Ukraine support and European security

At 29, Johannes Volkmann is among the youngest members of the Bundestag, but his family name carries weight: he is the grandson of Helmut Kohl, the chancellor who oversaw German reunification. That lineage is not why he sits on the foreign affairs committee and the cross-party United4Ukraine network of legislators. It is because, as head of the Lahn-Dill district council in Hesse, he launched a municipal partnership with Brovary, a city near Kyiv, to deliver supplies directly to Ukrainians. A year after his last visit, he returned to a country where airstrikes have intensified yet the determination to resist has not wavered.

Germany's stake in Ukraine's defence

Volkmann's central argument is transactional: every euro Berlin spends on Ukraine is an investment in German and European security. Germany is the largest bilateral donor to Ukraine in Europe, a fact he cites not for moral posturing but to frame the debate in terms of national interest. Russian imperialism, he says, threatens not only Ukraine's borders but those of NATO allies in the Baltic states and Poland. The war has also turned Ukraine into a security provider. Battlefield experience with drones, modern tactics and soldier training now flows back to European armies, giving Kyiv a "tremendous lead" that makes it a partner rather than a supplicant.

This framing matters because the political wind in Berlin is shifting. The Alternative for Germany (AfD) leads several national polls and has called for an end to German support for Ukraine. The Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW) echoes that demand. For Ukrainians watching from Kyiv, the question is no longer abstract: what happens if the AfD enters government after the next federal election, due no later than 2029?

The AfD firewall and the 2029 horizon

Volkmann is unambiguous. The CDU/CSU parliamentary group has ruled out any cooperation with the AfD, and Ukraine policy is a primary reason. He acknowledges the fear in Ukraine but insists the current Bundestag, elected until 2029, remains committed. The firewall is not merely tactical; it reflects a strategic judgment that a German government including the AfD would fracture the European consensus on Russia. That consensus, fragile as it is, underwrites the sanctions regime, the military aid pipeline and the political signal to Moscow that time is not on its side.

Hybrid threats and the Article 5 test

Sceptics ask how a military that has struggled in Ukraine could threaten NATO. Volkmann dismisses the premise. Russia's hybrid attacks, cyber operations, disinformation, energy coercion, migration pressure, are designed not to conquer territory but to destroy EU and NATO cohesion. He warns of a scenario in which Moscow, possibly backed by nuclear threats, occupies a limited area in the Baltic region to test Article 5, the alliance's collective defence clause. Deterrence, he argues, requires European capacity to defend itself; weakness invites aggression.

The 2008 mistake and the Nord Stream illusion

Volkmann offers a rare mea culpa for his party's past. At the 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest, Germany opposed granting Ukraine a Membership Action Plan. The rationale was that trade, particularly gas via the Nord Stream pipelines, would create mutual dependencies that prevented violence. Neutrality, the argument ran, would protect others. Both assumptions collapsed. "It was a big mistake for Germany to not listen to the insights of our neighbors to the east," he says, referring to Poland and the Baltic states whose historical experience with Moscow gave them a clearer reading of Russian intent. The Nord Stream infrastructure, once touted as a peace dividend, became a lever of coercion before its destruction in 2022.

EU accession: Merz draws a line

If NATO membership is a security question, EU membership is a legal and institutional one. Chancellor Friedrich Merz has ruled out accelerated admission for Ukraine. Volkmann defends the distinction: the European Union is a community based on the rule of law with 35 negotiating chapters. Rushing the process before Ukraine meets the criteria would help neither side. Yet he insists the door remains open. "Once certain milestones are met, the process of European integration will move forward." Ukraine is fighting to be a European country; full membership with free self-determination is the logical endpoint.

Corruption: exposure as a test of credibility

Volkmann does not dodge the corruption scandals touching President Zelenskyy's inner circle. He is "very worried" but argues that exposure is preferable to cover-up. Thorough investigations and transparent verdicts are essential; false compromises would erode the Western taxpayer's willingness to fund the war effort. He urges Ukrainian civil society, journalists, parliament and opposition to keep pressure on both Ukrainian and European funds. The credibility of the aid coalition depends on it.

No peace without a Russian recalculation

There are no serious peace negotiations. The Kremlin's maximalist demands amount to Ukrainian surrender. Volkmann notes that numerous attempts by Kyiv and Western capitals to open talks have met no reciprocal Russian interest. A Russian desire for peace will emerge only when Putin recognises the futility of military conquest. That recognition requires three things: increased military, financial and civil support for Ukraine; a clear message that European backing will not expire in 2027 or 2028; and the maintenance of deterrence against hybrid escalation. "We stand with Ukraine, today and tomorrow," he says.