CDU's Volkmann argues Ukraine aid is strategic investment not charity

At 29, Johannes Volkmann is one of the youngest members of the Bundestag, but he speaks with the assurance of a politician who has made Ukraine the centre of his parliamentary work. The CDU deputy, grandson of former chancellor Helmut Kohl, chairs a municipal partnership between his home district of Lahn-Dill in Hessen and the Ukrainian city of Brovary, near Kyiv. He sits on the foreign affairs committee and belongs to United4Ukraine, an international network of legislators. When he returned from his latest trip to the country this month, his message was blunt: German aid is not charity, it is an insurance premium on European security.

The security calculus has shifted

Volkmann's core argument is that the balance of give-and-take has changed. Germany is the largest bilateral donor to Ukraine in Europe, a fact he cites not as a burden but as leverage. In return, Ukrainian forces now share battlefield experience that European armies lack, drone tactics, electronic warfare, rapid adaptation of commercial technology for military use. "Ukraine is now effectively a provider of security in Europe and no longer merely in need of security," he said. That reversal matters because European defence industrial bases have struggled to modernise at speed. Ukrainian units have iterated drone doctrine in real combat, producing lessons that NATO training centres are only beginning to absorb.

The numbers bear out the scale. Since February 2022, Germany has committed more than €28 billion in military, humanitarian and financial aid, according to federal government figures. The latest tranche includes a €50 million pledge to repair the Chernobyl nuclear shelter, announced during Volkmann's visit. But the CDU politician frames the expenditure as a fraction of what a Russian victory would cost. If millions of Ukrainians flee westward to escape Russian rule, he argues, the fiscal and social burden on Germany and its neighbours would dwarf current outlays.

AfD opposition and the coalition arithmetic

The political threat to that consensus comes from the right. The Alternative for Germany (AfD) leads several national polls and has called for an immediate end to military support. The Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW), a left-nationalist party, echoes the demand for negotiations with Moscow. Volkmann acknowledges the fear this generates in Kyiv. "I can understand this fear," he said. "For me personally, as well as for my parliamentary group, the CDU/CSU, it is clear that Ukraine must be supported militarily because it is in our own interest in terms of security." He added that the AfD's Ukraine stance is a principal reason his party rules out any cooperation.

The Bundestag's current term runs to 2029. That horizon matters. Volkmann insists the Kremlin must not believe European resolve will fracture in 2027 or 2028. Deterrence, in his view, requires a credible commitment that outlasts electoral cycles. The AfD's polling strength makes that credibility contest live. If the party enters government, still unlikely given the CDU's firewall but not impossible in a fragmented parliament, the signal to Moscow would be that German support has an expiry date.

Hybrid warfare and the Article 5 test

Volkmann dismisses the argument that Russia's poor performance in Ukraine proves it poses no threat to NATO. He distinguishes between conventional conquest and hybrid operations designed to fracture alliance cohesion. "Russia's hybrid attacks on Europe are not primarily aimed at military conquest but rather at achieving certain political objectives," he said. "These include the destruction of EU and NATO cohesion." He warns that Moscow could test Article 5, the collective defence clause, by seizing a small piece of Baltic territory under a nuclear shadow, betting that allies will hesitate. The only answer, he argues, is visible European military capacity and political unity.

That assessment aligns with NATO's own strategic concept, updated in 2022, which identifies Russia as the most significant and direct threat to allies' security. The alliance has bolstered its eastern flank with four new multinational battlegroups in Hungary, Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria, supplementing the existing four in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. Germany leads the battlegroup in Lithuania and contributes forces to others. Yet capability gaps remain: air defence, long-range strike, and sustainable munitions production are all works in progress.

The 2008 Bucharest mistake

Volkmann is unusually candid about German historical responsibility. At the 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest, Germany opposed granting Ukraine a Membership Action Plan, alongside France. The rationale was that engagement, particularly energy trade via Nord Stream, would create mutual dependencies that prevented conflict. "It is clear that the hypothesis put forward by the German government at the time has turned out to have been wrong," he said. "The assumption that trade, for example in gas via the Nord Stream pipeline, would create mutual dependencies and thus prevent violence from occurring. The same applies to the assumption that neutrality would protect other countries."

He adds that Berlin ignored the warnings of eastern neighbours who, from their own history with Moscow, understood Russian intentions better. That admission is notable from a CDU politician; his party led the governments that pursued Ostpolitik and the Nord Stream projects. The pipeline was completed under Angela Merkel's chancellorship and only halted after the 2022 invasion. The economic cost of decoupling from Russian gas has been substantial, German industry still adjusts, but Volkmann treats it as vindication of the eastern critique.

EU accession: process over promises

On European Union membership, Volkmann draws a sharper distinction. Chancellor Friedrich Merz has ruled out accelerated admission, insisting on the standard 35 negotiating chapters. Volkmann supports that discipline. "The EU is a very comprehensive community based on the rule of law," he said. "To rush through the process despite Ukraine not being ready in certain areas would do neither it nor the EU any favours." But he insists the door must stay visibly open: once milestones are met, integration should move forward without political obstruction.

Ukraine applied for EU membership days after the invasion and was granted candidate status in June 2022, unprecedented speed. The European Commission's 2023 enlargement report noted progress on judicial reform and anti-corruption legislation but flagged persistent oligarchic influence and the need for deeper constitutional court independence. The Council opened accession negotiations in December 2023, a political decision that Merz supported. The technical work, however, will take years. Volkmann's position reflects a mainstream CDU view: enlargement is a merit-based process, not a geopolitical gesture.

Corrosion from within

Corruption remains the most corrosive risk to Western solidarity. Scandals involving officials close to President Volodymyr Zelenskyy have damaged trust in some European capitals. Volkmann does not minimise it. "Personally, I am very worried about this," he said. "It would be even worse if corruption scandals were not exposed. It is good when corruption cases are thoroughly investigated and there are no false compromises when dealing with them." He urges Ukrainian civil society, journalists and opposition politicians to keep pressure on, and says European partners will watch verdicts closely.

The EU has tied financial assistance to governance conditions. The €50 billion Ukraine Facility, agreed in February 2024, includes quarterly disbursements linked to reform milestones. The European Commission's first assessment, published in June, approved the initial tranche but highlighted the need for stronger anti-corruption enforcement and transparent procurement. For Germany, the largest net contributor to the EU budget, the credibility of that conditionality is a domestic political necessity as much as a Kyiv one.

No peace without deterrence

On diplomacy, Volkmann is sceptical. The Kremlin's public demands, recognition of annexed territories, Ukrainian neutrality, demilitarisation, amount to capitulation. "There are no serious signs that the Kremlin has any desire for peace," he said. "Such a desire for peace will only emerge when Putin recognises the futility of his efforts for military conquest." That recognition, in his view, requires increased military, financial and civil support, plus an unambiguous European commitment that does not expire.

The interview took place against a backdrop of intensified Russian aerial attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure and cities. Ukrainian officials report a sharp rise in glide bomb and missile strikes since late 2023, enabled by Russian adaptation of production lines and sanctions evasion. European air defence deliveries, including German IRIS-T and Patriot systems, have intercepted a high proportion, but stockpiles are finite. The EU's artillery ammunition pledge of one million rounds by March 2024 fell short; actual deliveries reached roughly 600,000. The gap matters on the front line.