Far-right vote share across Europe reaches 23% in latest national elections

Almost one in four European voters now backs a far-right party, according to the latest wave of the PopuList project, a collaborative effort by more than 150 political scientists across 31 countries. The share has climbed to 23% in the most recent round of national elections, a near fivefold increase from the 5% recorded in 1995 and roughly double the 10% observed a decade ago. The acceleration has been particularly pronounced since 2023, with far-right forces making historic gains in several of the continent's largest democracies.

The numbers behind the surge

The PopuList, launched in 2018 in partnership with the Guardian, applies a consistent definition: far-right parties are those espousing both nativism, the belief that a country should be inhabited solely by members of its native group, and authoritarianism, a preference for strict social order and severe punishment of transgressions. Using this framework, the project now identifies 133 far-right parties across Europe, up from 112 in 2003. Almost all are also classified as populist, meaning they frame politics as a struggle between a "pure people" and a "corrupt elite". In total, the survey counts 201 populist parties, most of them far-right or far-left, compared with 165 two decades ago.

The aggregate figure masks considerable national variation. In France, the National Rally (RN) surged from 19% to 37% in the 2024 legislative elections, becoming the largest single party in the National Assembly. Austria's Freedom Party (FPÖ) advanced from 16% to 29% in its 2024 parliamentary vote. Portugal's Chega rose from 7% to 18% in the 2024 election. In Germany, the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) doubled its support from 10% to 21% in the 2025 federal election, finishing as the country's second-largest party for the first time. Britain's Reform UK, which rejects the far-right label, increased its vote share from 2% in 2019 to 14% in 2024.

Where far-right parties now govern

Electoral success has translated into executive power. Far-right populist parties currently sit in governing coalitions in Croatia, Czechia, Italy and Finland. In Sweden, the Sweden Democrats prop up a right-wing minority government. The PopuList analysis finds far-right parties leading opinion polls in five major European democracies: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and the United Kingdom. This represents a profound shift from the post-war consensus that kept such forces at the margins of parliamentary politics.

The normalisation of these parties follows a self-reinforcing logic, according to Rooduijn. "The bigger and more successful they get, the more 'normal' they become," he said. "That's helped by the media, and by mainstream parties embracing their ideas." This dynamic has been visible in migration policy, where centre-right governments across Europe have adopted rhetoric and legislative proposals once confined to the fringes. The effect is to legitimise the underlying framing even when the far right is not in office.

Why the shift is accelerating

The PopuList researchers identify three interlocking drivers. First, voter attitudes towards core far-right themes, particularly immigration, have not changed dramatically over time, but have become far more decisive in vote choice. Issues that were once secondary now determine electoral allegiance. Second, the normalisation process described above lowers the social and psychological cost of voting for parties once treated as pariahs. Third, far-right parties have professionalised their communication. "They're just really, really good storytellers," Rooduijn said. "They know how to frame their message, which ultimately is always about an in-group and an out-group, the nation versus immigrants, judges, 'woke elites', whoever."

That storytelling produces a "heroes versus villains" narrative tied to an idealised past. The emotional palette has expanded beyond anger and contempt to include pride and hope, broadening the appeal beyond a protest vote. Campaign infrastructure, data targeting and social media strategy have all improved markedly. The result is a political offer that feels coherent and emotionally resonant to voters who feel alienated from mainstream parties.

The definitional debate and legal challenges

The far-right label is contested. In Germany, the domestic intelligence agency (BfV) designated the AfD a "suspected right-wing extremist" organisation, a classification upheld by the courts, though the party may not be described as "confirmed" extremist pending a further review. In France, the Council of State rejected a 2024 challenge by the National Rally to its interior ministry classification as "extrême droite", ruling that the party's core ideology, rhetoric and platform justified the label. In Belgium, the predecessor of Vlaams Belang, Vlaams Blok, was dissolved in 2004 after the high court upheld a lower court verdict describing it as racist; the rebranded party has since become a dominant force in Flemish politics.

Courts have generally held that such classifications fall within the realm of political science and that media, state authorities and opponents are free to apply them based on foundational ideology. The PopuList's academic definition, nativism plus authoritarianism, aligns with the criteria used in these rulings. The distinction between "radical right" (operating within the democratic framework) and "extreme right" (seeking to overthrow it) remains analytically useful but is often blurred in practice, since messaging varies, internal factions differ, and positions shift over time.

Setbacks and counter-trends

The trajectory has not been uniform. In the Netherlands, Geert Wilders' Freedom Party (PVV) lost nearly a third of its seats in the 2023 election, finishing second despite leading polls for much of the campaign. In Hungary, Viktor Orbán's Fidesz, classified by the PopuList as far-right, was comprehensively beaten by a centre-right rival in the April 2025 European Parliament election, a rare electoral reversal for a party that has dominated Hungarian politics for over a decade. These setbacks demonstrate that far-right support is not immutable, but they have not arrested the overall upward trend.

The persistence of the aggregate increase, even amid high-profile defeats, suggests structural rather than cyclical forces. Rooduijn emphasised: "It's important to emphasise this isn't a sudden thing. It's been under way for decades, and accelerating recently." The three-year surge from 2023 to 2025 represents the steepest incline in the three-decade dataset, but it sits atop a long-term climb that began in the mid-1990s.

What this means for European democracy

The rise of far-right populism presents a paradox for democratic systems. "They express citizen discontent," Rooduijn said. "So that's good for democracy. But their ideas are not always compatible with liberal democracy's core principles. That is especially true of populist parties on the far right." The experience of Hungary, Poland and the United States illustrates the risk: when far-right populists gain power, they often weaken judicial independence, restrict media freedom and curtail minority rights, eroding the liberal safeguards that distinguish electoral democracy from liberal democracy.

For the European Union, the implications are immediate. With far-right parties leading polls in founding member states and governing in others, the Council of Ministers and the European Council increasingly include voices hostile to deeper integration, migration solidarity and rule-of-law enforcement. The European Parliament's composition after the 2024 elections reflected the shift, with the Patriots for Europe and Europe of Sovereign Nations groups together commanding a significant bloc. The Commission's ability to advance its legislative agenda, on climate, digital regulation, enlargement, now depends on navigating a more fragmented and polarised political landscape.