France joins push to loosen unanimity rule on EU foreign policy

Eleven European Union member states, including France and Germany, have formally called for changes to how the bloc makes foreign policy and security decisions, urging moves towards majority voting that would end the ability of a single country to block collective action. The letter, addressed to High Representative Kaja Kallas and signed by the foreign ministers of Austria, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Belgium, the Netherlands, Romania, Spain, France and Germany, sets out five proposals to accelerate decision-making under the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Its existence, reported as foreign ministers prepare to meet in Wicklow, Ireland this week, marks a notable development: France, which has long resisted any dilution of national vetoes in this area, has put its name to a document that explicitly opens the door to qualified majority voting.

How unanimity became a vulnerability

Under current EU treaties, decisions falling under the CFSP heading require unanimous agreement from all 27 member states. The rule was designed to protect sovereign interests in matters of war, peace and international relations. In practice, it has allowed a single government to paralyse EU positions that the other 26 support.

No recent leader exploited this mechanism more thoroughly than Viktor Orbán. During his tenure as Hungarian prime minister, Orbán repeatedly used the veto to block EU statements on China, sanctions packages and other foreign policy positions, often in ways that appeared to serve Budapest's bilateral ties with Moscow and Beijing rather than any broader European interest. The frustration this generated across other capitals was palpable. Senior diplomats in Brussels grew accustomed to drafting statements that could be watered down or delayed for weeks while Hungary extracted concessions on unrelated domestic priorities, including access to EU recovery funds.

Orbán is now described as a former prime minister. But the structural vulnerability he exposed remains. Any future government willing to break ranks can replicate the playbook. The letter from the 11 states is, at its core, an attempt to close that vulnerability before it is tested again.

France abandons its traditional position

For years, the debate over CFSP voting reform had a familiar shape. Germany, the Netherlands and the Nordic states pushed for qualified majority voting, arguing that unanimity made the EU a sluggish and unreliable actor on the world stage. France resisted, insisting that foreign policy was too sensitive to be decided by majority and that Paris would not be bound by positions it disagreed with on matters as consequential as sanctions or military engagement.

That France has now signed a letter that explicitly contemplates greater use of qualified majority voting is a shift worth noting. The language is careful. The signatories say they "continue to strive for consensus wherever possible." But the next sentence carries the weight: "But we must also ensure that this culture of consensus fosters common action rather than preventing it, otherwise we will have legitimacy but no strength."

The letter does not endorse wholesale replacement of unanimity with majority voting. It opens the door to incremental change, potentially expanding the use of existing treaty provisions that already permit qualified majority voting in certain CFSP situations, such as implementing decisions previously agreed by unanimity, or when the European Council decides by unanimity to move an area to QMV.

France's willingness to sign signals that even the most sovereignty-conscious capitals now regard the status quo as untenable. Whether Paris will accept reforms that genuinely constrain its own veto when concrete decisions are on the table remains an open question.

Restructuring the diplomatic machinery

The letter is not the only reform document circulating ahead of the Wicklow meeting. A separate Franco-German discussion paper addresses the European External Action Service, the EU's diplomatic branch that Kallas heads, proposing structural changes that would fold much of its work into the European Commission.

Under the proposals, Kallas would become an executive vice-president of the Commission with "de facto" oversight of external-facing policy units covering trade, development aid and defence. Much of the EEAS staff would be embedded within the Commission in a new department for external relations. Staff working on security and defence policy would remain in the EEAS. The ratio of one-third of EEAS staff being seconded diplomats from member states would be maintained in the new unit.

The paper also envisages a formal role for the High Representative to report directly to EU leaders on foreign policy matters and receive instructions from them during European Council gatherings, strengthening the link between the EEAS and the governments that set its direction.

The institutional tensions at stake

These proposals address a long-running tension. The EEAS, created under the Lisbon Treaty, has always sat in an awkward institutional position: neither fully a Commission service nor a Council secretariat, answerable to both but wholly owned by neither. Its staff are a mix of Commission officials and seconded national diplomats, which creates competing loyalties and bureaucratic friction. Bringing most of its work under the Commission umbrella could streamline decision-making and reduce duplication, but it could also reduce the influence of member states over day-to-day diplomacy.

The idea of making the High Representative an executive vice-president is not new. It has been floated in various forms since the EEAS was established in 2010, and it mirrors the arrangement that gave Margrethe Vestager a similar portfolio title for competition during the previous Commission. The difference here is scope: Kallas would gain oversight of trade and development aid, portfolios that currently sit with separate commissioners and have their own institutional constituencies. Whether those commissioners would accept subordination to the High Representative is far from certain.

Maintaining the one-third secondment ratio for national diplomats is a deliberate concession to member states worried about losing influence. It ensures that the restructured external relations department would still carry national perspectives rather than becoming a purely Commission-driven bureaucracy. But it also preserves the mixed reporting lines that have complicated the EEAS since its creation.

What qualified majority voting would change in practice

Qualified majority voting in the CFSP context would mean that a decision could be taken if supported by at least 55 per cent of member states representing at least 65 per cent of the EU population. At present, 15 member states representing roughly 65 per cent of the population can carry a QMV decision in other policy areas.

The practical impact would be immediate. Sanctions packages, which currently require unanimity and have been delayed by Hungarian objections in recent years, could be adopted more quickly. Common positions on international crises could be issued without waiting for the last holdout to withdraw its objection. The EU would be able to speak with something closer to a single voice on the world stage.

The risk, as opponents of QMV have long argued, is that member states could find themselves bound by foreign policy positions they voted against. For smaller states, this raises the prospect of being outvoted by larger ones on questions that touch on core national interests. The treaty does provide an emergency brake, allowing a member state to declare that vital national interests are at stake, but the threshold for invoking it and the consequences of doing so are untested.

The road ahead

The Wicklow discussions are informal. No decisions will be taken there. The Gymnich format, named after the German castle where the first such meeting was held, is designed for ministers to debate freely without the pressure of formal conclusions. But the letter from the 11 states gives the conversation a concrete starting point and a degree of political weight it would otherwise lack.

Treaty change to abolish the unanimity rule entirely would require the agreement of all 27 member states, which creates an obvious paradox: the country whose veto is the problem would need to agree to give up its veto. The letter's signatories know this, which is why their proposals focus on making better use of existing treaty provisions rather than calling for full treaty revision. The so-called passerelle clause in Article 31 of the Treaty on European Union already allows the European Council to move specific CFSP decisions to QMV by unanimous agreement. It has never been used. Whether this week's discussions in Wicklow will generate the political momentum to activate it for the first time is the question that matters now.