World · Transatlantic relations
Trump's second term exports MAGA ideology into European politics
From Honduras to Brussels, the US president is treating foreign policy as an extension of domestic culture war, backing right-wing candidates, attacking EU climate laws and funding conservative networks across the continent.
When Donald Trump posted on Truth Social that Honduras would face 'hell to pay' if it altered the result of its presidential election, he was not merely commenting on a distant vote. He was signalling a new doctrine: the export of Make America Great Again politics into the internal affairs of sovereign states, allies and adversaries alike. The target was Nasry Asfura, the conservative candidate locked in a near-tie with centrist Salvador Nasralla, separated at one point by roughly 500 votes. Honduras has a history of disputed elections in 2013 and 2017, but the intervention by a sitting US president marked a departure from the unwritten principle of non-interference in allied democracies.
The Honduras intervention: a template for wider interference
Cathryn Clüver-Ashbrook, a trans-Atlantic expert at the Bertelsmann Foundation, argues that Trump has developed a taste for political spheres of influence. 'He sees himself almost as imperial in his role in the White House, and he likes it when the world dances to his tune, especially in the Western Hemisphere,' she said. The Honduras case sits alongside military operations off the coast of Venezuela, over $20 billion in support for Argentine President Javier Milei, and pressure on the Colombian government. 'A new policy is emerging here that the US has not pursued so actively toward its neighbours in Latin and South America for a long time,' Clüver-Ashbrook noted.
The pattern extends well beyond the Americas. In the first year of his second term, Trump has instructed US diplomats to promote anti-immigration policies in European capitals. The Heritage Foundation, the conservative think tank that produced Project 2025, a blueprint for restructuring the federal government published in April 2025, has actively lobbied against the EU's climate targets. According to Clüver-Ashbrook, Project 2025's core documents argue that US foreign policy should be more closely aligned with strict conservative values, an 'ideologization' that marks a break with post-war precedent.
Project 2025 and the ideological blueprint
Celia Belin, author of a May 2025 study for the European Council on Foreign Relations, concluded that domestic and foreign policy have effectively merged for Trump. 'Liberals and Democrats are the enemy within; Europeans are their extension outside,' she wrote. In this framing, Europe is perceived as a 'parasite' exploiting the United States, mirroring the accusation Trump levels at his domestic opponents. The ideological coherence is deliberate. Steve Bannon, Trump's former campaign adviser, recently described Russia as a 'devoutly Christian nation' and a 'true ally during World War II', language that reflects a civilisational worldview shared by parts of the European right.
Clüver-Ashbrook agrees that the administration is pursuing a 'major ideological shift' driven by 'very strategic ambitions regarding foreign policy'. The shift is not merely rhetorical. It has operational consequences: the Heritage Foundation and allied organisations are now gearing up to expand their influence in Europe through party donations, conference funding and media support. The annual Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) has become a networking hub for these transnational conservative movements.
The Signal chat that revealed the administration's contempt
The clearest window into the administration's mindset came earlier this year when The Atlantic published a leaked Signal chat discussing a potential US strike on Yemen. Vice President JD Vance wrote that the operation would benefit Europe more than the United States, adding: 'I just hate bailing Europe out again.' Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, who now styles himself Secretary of War, replied: 'I fully share your loathing of European free-loading. It's PATHETIC.' The exchange, verified by multiple US outlets, confirmed what European officials had long suspected: the contempt is genuine and bipartisan within the MAGA coalition.
Pawel Zerka of the ECFR believes Europe is now the theatre of an open ideological battle waged by the US government over values such as migration, climate change, 'wokeism' and freedom of expression. 'Trump supports New Right movements wherever possible, normalising its radical positions,' Zerka said. The strategies include active interference in elections favouring right-wing and conservative candidates, and the establishment of a 'MAGA International' through conservative networks, right-wing media outlets, parties and conferences.
Building a "MAGA International" in Europe
The infrastructure for this project is already visible. CPAC events have been held in Hungary, Poland and Spain, often hosted by governments or parties aligned with the European right. US-based conservative foundations fund European think tanks, legal groups and media platforms that amplify anti-EU, anti-migration and climate-sceptic narratives. The Heritage Foundation's engagement on EU climate policy is not incidental; it reflects a calculation that European regulation sets global standards, and weakening those standards serves US fossil-fuel interests as well as ideological ones.
European officials have noticed. The European Commission's foreign policy service has tracked a rise in coordinated disinformation campaigns targeting the Green Deal and migration compacts, many originating from US-based networks amplified by Russian state media. The convergence of messaging, 'climate hysteria', 'great replacement', 'gender ideology', suggests a shared playbook. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, a frequent CPAC speaker, has described the Trump administration as a strategic partner in the 'culture war' against Brussels.
The vulnerability of European party funding
Clüver-Ashbrook and the German civil society group LobbyControl have highlighted a structural weakness: party donation laws in Germany and several other EU states are too lax to prevent foreign influence. 'Well-funded organisations, which were also behind the Heritage Foundation and Project 2025, are now gearing up to expand their influence, through party donations, for example,' Clüver-Ashbrook warned. The gateway is particularly wide for state-controlled or newly state-aligned funds from the US. Unlike the United States, where the Foreign Agents Registration Act requires disclosure of foreign lobbying, most European regimes rely on self-reporting with minimal enforcement.
The German Bundestag has debated tightening the Political Parties Act, but progress has stalled amid disagreements over threshold levels and the definition of 'foreign influence'. In France, the National Rally's historical financing from Russian banks has already demonstrated how external money can shape a major party's trajectory. The difference now is the scale and coordination: a US administration openly sympathetic to European right-wing parties, backed by a network of foundations with billions in assets, represents a different order of magnitude.
European responses and the question of unity
Zerka argues that Europe must not let itself be pushed around. 'Instead of seeing itself as dependent on the US, it must represent its interests as a whole and with confidence, even in the face of pressure from the White House.' He points out that the majority of EU member states are still led by pro-European politicians, a potential basis for a united front. Yet the bloc remains divided along national and party lines. The European People's Party, the largest group in the European Parliament, includes member parties that cooperate with CPAC and share the Heritage Foundation's scepticism of climate regulation.
The European Commission has begun drafting a defence-of-democracy package that would require greater transparency for political advertising and foreign funding of parties and foundations. But the proposal faces resistance from governments wary of Brussels overreach and from MEPs who see it as a tool to target the right. The paradox is that the very parties most vulnerable to foreign influence are often the loudest opponents of EU-level safeguards.
Sources
People mentioned
Cathryn Clüver-Ashbrook
Celia Belin
Pawel Zerka
Organisations
Bertelsmann Foundation · European Council on Foreign Relations · Heritage Foundation · Truth Social · The Atlantic · Conservative Political Action Conference