Merz survives second Bundestag vote but authority damaged from day one

Tuesday, 6 May 2025 was supposed to mark the return of German leadership in Europe. Instead it delivered a humiliation that will reverberate far beyond the Bundestag chamber. Friedrich Merz, the Christian Democratic Union leader who had negotiated a coalition deal with the Social Democrats, failed to secure an absolute majority in the first ballot for chancellor, a parliamentary precedent without modern equivalent. He won the second vote, but the damage was done before he took the oath.

A parliamentary precedent with no modern parallel

In the Federal Republic's history, every chancellor-designate who reached the Bundestag with a signed coalition agreement had passed the first ballot. Merz fell short by a margin that remains officially unexplained: some deputies voted against him, others abstained, and a handful may have made errors on the secret ballot. The CDU/CSU and SPD together hold 328 of 630 seats, a comfortable majority on paper. That it was not enough suggests either disciplined dissent or a breakdown in party whip operations, or both.

The result stunned observers in Berlin and capitals across Europe. Volodymyr Zelenskyy, whose wartime leadership has made him the most insistent voice for European strategic autonomy, offered congratulations laced with expectation. "We sincerely hope that Germany will grow even stronger," he said, "and that we'll see more German leadership in European and transatlantic affairs." The subtext was unmistakable: Kyiv sees Berlin's hesitation as a direct constraint on Ukraine's survival.

A pattern of miscalculation

Merz's first weeks in the spotlight have been marked by impulsive judgements that backfired. Before the February election, he gambled on passing a migration motion in the Bundestag with AfD support, calculating that the move would harden the CDU's conservative appeal. The opposite occurred: the CDU slid in the polls while the AfD surged to 21 per cent, its best federal result yet, finishing second ahead of the SPD. The tactic also shattered a decades-old taboo against cooperating with the far right, handing the AfD a propaganda victory it still exploits.

On election night, Merz compounded the error with astonishingly blunt statements attacking Donald Trump and questioning NATO's viability. Whatever the merits of his frustration with Washington, the timing, before he had even formed a government, signalled a leader prone to speaking before thinking. Allies in Paris, Warsaw and Brussels noted the indiscipline. Adversaries in Moscow and Beijing noted the division.

The French parallel deepens the vacuum

Germany's weakness would be manageable if France were strong. It is not. Emmanuel Macron's snap election gamble last summer produced a hung parliament in which no bloc can govern. The National Assembly remains deadlocked on budgets, defence and EU policy. Recent polling indicates Jordan Bardella, the National Rally president, would enter a 2027 presidential run-off with a genuine chance of victory. INSEE data shows French economic growth hovering near stagnation, limiting Macron's room for manoeuvre even if he had a parliamentary majority.

The Franco-German motor, already sputtering under Scholz and Macron, now risks seizing entirely. For three years Scholz talked of a Zeitenwende, a turning point in German defence policy, but delivered tanks and long-range missiles to Ukraine only after months of hesitation. His three-party coalition collapsed under the weight of its own contradictions. Merz inherits the same structural problems with a weaker mandate.

Economic stagnation compounds political weakness

The German economy contracted in 2023 and 2024, the first back-to-back annual declines since the early 2000s. Destatis figures show industrial production down 5.2 per cent year-on-year as of March 2025, with automotive and chemicals, the backbone of the export model, hit hardest by energy costs, Chinese competition and US tariff threats. The coalition agreement promises tax cuts, deregulation and a reform of the debt brake to fund infrastructure and defence. Each requires parliamentary discipline that the first ballot suggests may not exist.

Migration, the issue that propelled the AfD's rise, remains unresolved. The coalition deal tightens asylum rules and expands border controls, but implementation depends on state governments, several of which are led by the Greens or include SPD ministers reluctant to enforce hardline measures. The AfD will exploit every delay, every deportation failure, every crime committed by an asylum seeker. Merz's authority to face them down has been diminished before he began.

What this means for Ukraine and NATO

Zelenskyy's message was diplomatic but the strategic reality is stark. Ukraine needs German Taurus missiles, air defence systems and a sustained industrial commitment to ammunition production. It also needs Germany to lead the European pillar of NATO at a moment when the US president has threatened to withdraw security guarantees. NATO's latest summit communiqué emphasised European burden-sharing; Berlin's paralysis makes that goal harder to achieve.

Merz has promised a "whatever it takes" approach to defence spending, including a special fund outside the debt brake. The SPD agreed in coalition talks. But the Bundestag must approve the constitutional amendment with a two-thirds majority. That now requires votes from the Greens or the Free Democrats, parties that will extract concessions. The first ballot suggests Merz cannot take his own backbenchers for granted, let alone opposition deputies.

The Merkel shadow

Angela Merkel's 16-year tenure was defined by caution, but also by a ruthless internal discipline that kept the CDU united. She reportedly blocked Merz from powerful cabinet posts after he challenged her leadership in the early 2000s, a decision critics now interpret as a judgement on his temperament. Merz spent years in the private sector, including a stint at BlackRock, before returning to politics. His rhetoric suggests a man who believes he understands power; his first parliamentary test suggests he misread his own party.

Katja Hoyer, a historian at the European Council on Foreign Relations, put it bluntly: "This is not the start of a confident, stable government, but a sign of how deep the fissures of the German centre ground run." The centre's erosion is not uniquely German. Britain's Labour government faces a Reform UK surge. France's centre cannot hold. Italy's government is stable but eurosceptic. The EU's traditional anchor points are drifting.

The structural challenge no coalition can easily fix

Germany's problems predate Merz. The export model built on cheap Russian energy, open Chinese markets and US security guarantees has collapsed on all three fronts. The energy transition is behind schedule; Bundesbank projections show potential growth below 0.5 per cent annually. The debt brake, enshrined in the constitution since 2009, constrains fiscal response unless amended, which requires the two-thirds majority Merz may struggle to muster.

Demographics compound the economics. The working-age population is shrinking. The pension system faces a funding gap that no party has honestly addressed. Migration could fill labour shortages, but the political consensus to manage it humanely and effectively has fractured. The AfD's 21 per cent represents not just a protest vote but a structural realignment: eastern states where the AfD leads are also those with the oldest populations and weakest economies.