Orban and Fico lose ground at home despite Trump's return

The assumption that Donald Trump's return to the White House would automatically fortify Europe's nationalist leaders is collapsing under the weight of domestic politics. In Budapest and Bratislava, the two figures most closely aligned with Trump's worldview, Viktor Orban and Robert Fico, are fighting for political survival rather than projecting strength abroad.

Hungary: Orban's toughest year since 2010

Viktor Orban has led Hungary since 2010, building a system that critics describe as illiberal while maintaining warm relations with Moscow and Beijing. His Fidesz party has won four consecutive parliamentary elections, most recently in April 2022 with 54% of the vote. But the political landscape has shifted markedly since late 2024.

Péter Magyar, a former Fidesz insider turned opposition leader, launched the Tisza Party in 2024. Since November, multiple opinion polls have shown Tisza pulling ahead of Fidesz among decided voters, commanding 35% to 45% support, a lead of four to six percentage points. If that trend holds until the parliamentary election due in 2026, Orban could face his first electoral defeat in fifteen years.

Analysts at Eurasia Group described Orban's current predicament in a January note: his state-aligned media relentlessly emphasise his diplomatic contacts with Trump, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, framing him as a global peacemaker. Yet the reality, they wrote, is that Orban is facing his most difficult year since first taking power, undermining his ability to hijack, let alone drive, the EU agenda as the bloc's preeminent populist leader.

The energy dimension is central. Hungary has resisted EU initiatives to cut Russian gas and oil imports, citing fears of mounting household energy costs. Last Monday, Orban backed down from a threat to block an extension of EU sanctions on Russia after the bloc provided energy security assurances. The climbdown was a public demonstration that domestic vulnerability constrains his foreign policy posturing.

Slovakia: Coalition fracture and street protests

Robert Fico returned as prime minister in October 2023 after his SMER-SSD party won the September election on a platform opposing military aid to Ukraine and criticising EU sanctions on Russia. His coalition held a narrow majority, but that evaporated in January 2025 when four MPs withdrew their support.

Andrius Tursa of risk consultancy Teneo confirmed the development: despite the opposition's withdrawal of a no-confidence motion earlier in January, Fico saw his governing coalition lose its majority after four MPs withdrew their support. In addition, Fico faced some of the largest public protests since 1989 in opposition to his government's increasingly pro-Russian foreign policy. More demonstrations are planned. Meanwhile, the latest opinion polls show that opposition Progressive Slovakia has overtaken SMER-SSD as the most popular party in the country.

The protests, which drew tens of thousands to Bratislava and other cities, reflect anger at Fico's decision to halt military aid to Ukraine, his criticism of EU sanctions, and a perceived dismantling of rule-of-law safeguards. The political crisis has raised the possibility of an early election, well before the scheduled 2027 date. Fico's government now operates day-to-day without a guaranteed parliamentary majority, dependent on ad-hoc support for each vote.

The Trump effect fails to materialise

Timothy Ash, senior emerging markets strategist at RBC Bluebay Asset Management, captured the broader dynamic. The re-election of Donald Trump for a second term in the US had seemed to be a clarion call for a structural political shift towards similarly populist, MAGA-style movements across Europe, he wrote in emailed comments. Actually what we are seeing is a somewhat mixed picture across Europe, and actually with many of Trump's apostles being on the back foot.

The source of the disappointment is not mysterious. Both Orban and Fico have tied their foreign policy to a bet that Trump's return would weaken Western unity on Ukraine and sanctions. Instead, the EU has maintained its sanctions packages, approved a €50 billion Ukraine facility in February 2024, and continued reducing Russian energy dependence. Domestic voters, meanwhile, are judging leaders on inflation, healthcare, corruption and the cost of living, not on geopolitical alignment with Washington.

Wider European context: gains but no blocking minority

The picture beyond Hungary and Slovakia is more nuanced. Germany's Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) and France's National Rally have made undeniable electoral gains over the past decade, fuelled by dissatisfaction with the EU's handling of irregular migration. Both parties now wield considerable influence over national policy debates. Forthcoming elections in Germany, Austria and the Czech Republic could see further populist advances in 2025.

Yet Eurasia Group notes that anti-EU governments will remain well short of the blocking minority needed in the European Council to seriously disrupt EU decision-making. Where far-right parties have entered government, as in Italy under Giorgia Meloni or the Netherlands under Geert Wilders' coalition, they have tended to shift toward the political centre on core EU issues, with Hungary the notable exception. The consultancy argues that the far right's prospects depend on whether mainstream governments can find more effective responses to the migration pressures that remain the strongest driver of populist support.

Energy dependence as political vulnerability

Both Orban and Fico have justified their resistance to EU energy diversification by citing the risk of price spikes for households and industry. Hungary receives Russian gas via the TurkStream pipeline and has expanded the Paks nuclear plant with Russian technology. Slovakia, while more integrated into EU gas networks, still relies on Russian oil supplies to its Slovnaft refinery in Bratislava.

This dependence creates a feedback loop. The leaders argue they cannot afford to cut Russian supplies, so they oppose sanctions and diversification, but that opposition fuels domestic discontent, as voters see them prioritising Moscow over European solidarity and domestic rule of law. The EU's provision of energy security assurances to Orban in exchange for his sanctions vote shows the bloc recognises this vulnerability and is willing to manage it pragmatically.