Germany's election looms with coalition arithmetic dominating the campaign

Germany goes to the polls on 23 February 2025, seven months earlier than scheduled, after the three-party traffic light coalition imploded in November. Chancellor Olaf Scholz dismissed his finance minister, Christian Lindner, citing a breakdown of trust over economic policy. The move triggered a confidence vote that Scholz lost, setting the stage for an election that will reshape the political landscape of Europe's largest economy.

The collapse of the traffic light coalition

The alliance of the Social Democrats (SPD, red), the Free Democrats (FDP, yellow) and the Greens (green) lasted barely three years. It was the first three-party coalition at federal level since the 1950s and its collapse followed months of public bickering over budget rules, climate policy and industrial strategy. Lindner's insistence on adhering to the constitutional debt brake clashed with Scholz and Green vice-chancellor Robert Habeck's push for higher investment. The final rupture came over a package of economic reforms that Lindner presented without cabinet agreement. Scholz fired him on 6 November 2024; the FDP ministers resigned the same day, leaving a minority government of SPD and Greens that could not pass legislation.

The episode echoed 1982, when the FDP switched allegiance from Helmut Schmidt's SPD to Helmut Kohl's CDU, bringing down a chancellor for the first time in the Federal Republic's history. This time the FDP did not switch sides; it simply walked out, gambling that an early election would improve its fortunes. Current polls suggest that gamble may have backfired.

The main contenders: SPD and CDU/CSU

The SPD enters the campaign as the incumbent party of government but with its worst polling in decades. Scholz, 66, emphasises his experience and the party's record on minimum wage increases, pension guarantees and social housing. The SPD's narrative leans heavily on its history: founded in the 1860s, banned by the Nazis, and the party of chancellors Willy Brandt, Helmut Schmidt and Gerhard Schröder. Yet the Scholz chancellery has been defined more by crisis management, pandemic, energy shock, war in Ukraine, than by a distinct domestic agenda.

The CDU/CSU bloc, led by Friedrich Merz, 69, holds a consistent lead in surveys, typically around 30 percent. Merz, a former corporate lawyer and one-time rival of Angela Merkel, promises a return to the party's right-wing roots after sixteen years of Merkel's centrist stewardship. His platform centres on stricter immigration controls, a reversal of the nuclear phase-out, tax cuts for businesses and a tougher line on citizen's benefit (Bürgergeld) recipients. The CSU, led by Bavarian minister-president Markus Söder, campaigns only in Bavaria but delivers a reliable bloc of seats; the two parties form a single parliamentary group in the Bundestag.

The kingmakers: FDP and Greens

Both the FDP and the Greens face existential questions. The FDP, traditionally the liberal kingmaker that has participated in more federal governments than any other party, hovers at or below the five percent threshold in many polls. If it falls short, it loses all representation, a fate it suffered in 2013. Lindner argues that only the FDP can prevent a left-green majority and guard against state overreach. Critics counter that the party's rigid opposition to any relaxation of the debt brake made it an unreliable partner in the traffic light coalition.

The Greens, by contrast, have consolidated around 12-14 percent. They have travelled a long distance from the knitted-pullover protest party that entered the Bundestag in 1983. Today they are the most Atlanticist force in German politics, advocating strong military support for Ukraine and a robust NATO posture. Habeck, 55, and foreign minister Annalena Baerbock represent the party's realist wing. Their challenge is to retain younger, climate-focused voters while defending a record in government that includes the controversial heating law and the extension of coal-fired power during the energy crisis.

The far right and the firewall

Alternative for Germany (AfD) has settled into second place nationally at roughly 20 percent, with support concentrated in the eastern states where it frequently tops 30 percent. Founded in 2013 as a Eurosceptic professors' party, it pivoted hard against immigration after Merkel's 2015 decision to open the borders to Syrian refugees. Its platform now combines climate scepticism, pro-Russia positions, and alignment with Donald Trump, Elon Musk has publicly endorsed the party. Several leading figures have used Nazi-era terminology, and the domestic intelligence agency (BfV) classifies parts of the party as confirmed right-wing extremist. A ban procedure is theoretically possible but politically fraught.

Every other party represented in the Bundestag has pledged not to cooperate with the AfD, the so-called Brandmauer or firewall. That pledge was tested in late January 2025 when Merz allowed a non-binding motion on stricter border controls to pass with AfD votes, breaking a decades-old taboo. The move provoked protests and accusations that the CDU was normalising the far right. Merz insisted the firewall remained intact for government formation; the episode nonetheless shifted the campaign's centre of gravity toward migration.

The new left challenger: BSW

Sahra Wagenknecht, 55, left Die Linke (The Left) in late 2023 to form the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW, violet). A prominent East German politician with a Marxist background, she describes the party as "left-conservative": economically redistributionist, socially conservative on immigration, and opposed to NATO and US military bases in Germany. The BSW surged in the 2024 eastern state elections, entering parliaments in Thuringia, Saxony and Brandenburg. Nationally it polls around five percent, exactly at the threshold. Whether it clears that hurdle will determine if the left-of-centre spectrum fragments further or consolidates.

Die Linke itself, after losing its Sahra Wagenknecht flank, has seen a revival among younger voters, particularly in western cities. It campaigns on rent caps, wealth taxes and pacifism. If both Linke and BSW enter the Bundestag, the left bloc gains seats but remains divided on foreign policy; if only one crosses the threshold, the arithmetic shifts toward the centre-right.

Coalition arithmetic: what the numbers allow

German coalition names derive from party colours. The outgoing traffic light (red-yellow-green) is history. The most discussed options for the next Bundestag are:

• Black-red (CDU/CSU + SPD): the classic grand coalition, last seen under Merkel 2013-2017 and 2018-2021. Probable if smaller parties falter.
• Germany coalition (black-red-yellow): CDU/CSU + SPD + FDP. Matches the national flag. Requires FDP to clear five percent.
• Kenya coalition (black-red-green): CDU/CSU + SPD + Greens. Would continue Green government participation but with a conservative anchor.
• Jamaica (black-yellow-green): CDU/CSU + FDP + Greens. Attempted in 2017; collapsed when FDP withdrew. Unlikely now given SPD's strength.
• Blackberry (black-red-violet): CDU/CSU + SPD + BSW. Seen at state level in Thuringia; nationally improbable given BSW's foreign policy positions.

The critical variable is the five percent threshold. If the FDP and BSW both fall short, the Bundestag would comprise only four parties, CDU/CSU, AfD, SPD, Greens, plus possibly Linke. That would make a two-party grand coalition mathematically comfortable and politically almost inevitable. If one or both small parties enter, the negotiation becomes a three-way puzzle with the SPD holding the balance between a conservative-liberal and a conservative-green axis.

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